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NO MUD PIES: RISK AVOIDANCE AS RISK REGULATION
Catherine A. O'Neill*t
INTRODUCTION
The Killarney Lake Recreation Site, in the Lower Coeur d'Alene River
Basin, is a popular place for families to camp overnight or to spend the day
picnicking, fishing, launching boats, and playing along the shore. This
stretch of the basin, however, is heavily contaminated with lead and other
metals-a legacy of mining and smelting operations conducted with scant
attention to the consequences for human and environmental health.
Although the parking lot at Killarney Lake has been paved to cap the
contaminated material underneath and clean topsoil has been spread to help
establish a grassy swale between the parking lot and the lake, no further
cleanup has been undertaken at the site. The surrounding soils and the lake
sediments continue to harbor high levels of lead and other metals. These
contaminants continue to pose a risk to the health of humans and wildlife
that use the site. So health and environmental agencies have posted a large
sign urging people to take steps to protect themselves.' The sign notes that
small children and pregnant women are at particular risk from exposure.2
The sign directs people to wash their hands, faces, toys, and pacifiers if
these have been in contact with the soil or dust; to avoid picnicking on the
ground; to remove soil from clothing, camping equipment, and pets before
leaving the area; and to ensure that their children: "PLAY CLEAN!
Children should play in grassy areas and avoid loose soil, dust, and muddy
areas. No mud pies."3
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Progressive Reform; J.D. 1990, University of Chicago Law School; B.A. 1987, University of Notre
Dame.
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1. NAT'L ACADS., BUNKER HILL MINING AND METALLURGICAL COMPLEX OPERABLE UNIT 3:
NAS REVIEw COMMITTEE TOUR (2004), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/Ri0/CLEANUP.NSF/fb6a4e3291f5d28388256d 140051048b/a2887c97I c IddOf
588256cceO0070aac/$FILE/NAS%20Review /20Committee%20Tour%2004l404.pdf (depicting the
sign at the Killarney Lake Recreation Site and noting that it is "a popular recreation site for camping and
various day uses, including fishing, boat launching and picnics").
2. 1d; accord Telephone Interview with Jerry Cobb, Panhandle Health District, Idaho (June
27, 2005).
3. Id. (emphasis added).
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The government decision makers charged with cleaning up the Coeur
d'Alene River Basin have opted for a form of risk avoidance-a regulatory
approach that addresses environmental risks by asking those whose
practices or lifeways expose them to contaminants to alter their ways in
order to avoid exposure. Other examples of risk avoidance measures
include fish and wildlife consumption advisories; use-restricted cleanups
and institutional controls; ozone alerts; pesticide and herbicide contact
warnings; beach advisories and closures; and boil-water notices. Risk
avoidance stands in contrast to risk reduction, which addresses
environmental risks by requiring contaminants to be prevented, reduced, or
cleaned up at the source. Risk avoidance leaves contamination unabated, in
whole or in part. It places responsibility on those exposed to avoid the fish,
water, soils, or air left polluted.
According to proponents, this shift from risk reduction to risk
avoidance promises large cost savings. Although the magnitude of the
potential savings is a matter of some dispute, it is likely that erecting a
fence, posting a warning sign, or maintaining a website entails modest
sums-whereas the price tag for prevention, reduction, or cleanup can run
into the millions. Other advantages, too, might be cited in favor of risk
avoidance.
But a move to risk avoidance introduces a raft of perils. Risk
avoidance focuses only on the targeted human health risk. As such, it
foregoes a web of ancillary benefits for human and ecological health, for
current and future generations. Risk avoidance introduces risks: as people
change their practices in accordance with warnings and advisories, they lose
the nutritional, health, and other benefits of their former ways. Risk
avoidance thwarts the flourishing of plural and diverse lifeways. Risk
avoidance is an approach of diminishing and ultimately finite possibilities,
as environments are permitted one by one to become and remain
contaminated. Risk avoidance is unjust: it disproportionately burdens tribes
and their members, people of color, and low-income people, and it may
offer alternatives for avoidance that are unrealistic or impossible from their
perspectives. And this is only if all goes well, that is, if agencies can
remedy the serious problems with communicating, implementing, and
enforcing in perpetuity the risk avoidance measure-if agencies can get the
children at Killarney Lake to wash their hands, to eat only on the tables, and
to stay out of the mud.
Ultimately, the question of whether risk avoidance is promising or
perilous requires us to consider some very basic questions about the kind of
world in which we wish to live. Do we wish to shape a world in which we
must refrain from eating the fish, drinking the water, playing at the field
[Vol. 31:273
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down the hill, working outdoors, and undertaking a host of other heretofore
ordinary, healthful, and even cherished human activities? Do we wish to
ask our children to stop making mud pies?
In fact, we as a society have reflected upon these basic questions. Our
collective commitment to risk reduction is embodied in a host of
environmental statutes and other laws. In these laws, we have agreed to
seek to prevent, reduce, and eliminate contamination and its consequent
risks. Risk avoidance, then, amounts to a radical departure from these
commitments-and, in many instances, a veritable rewriting of the
applicable laws.
Yet for the most part, the rise of risk avoidance has not been
accompanied by any effort to consider and justify such a move. Indeed,
risk avoidance approaches have only recently been recognized as such.
This is partly because the shift to risk avoidance often occurs quietly and
incrementally. Measures such as fish consumption advisories that are
intended to provide temporary warning until contamination could be abated
have been allowed to remain in place for years. To this end, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the current administration
has been a particular force, sidestepping statutory risk reduction
requirements and enlisting risk avoidance in their stead.
This slouch toward avoidance is troubling, among other things, because
risk avoidance becomes an approach adopted by default. Statutory
mandates wither, discretionary "programs" replace regulation, and interim
warning measures become permanent-but no one ever has the opportunity
expressly to debate whether this departure from current commitments is an
appropriate regulatory course. Such debate, of course, may properly belong
in legislative fora. Because risk avoidance in many instances charts a
departure from current statutory duties and deadlines, it will often require
legislative authorization. In any event, to the extent that legislatures or,
where legally permissible, agencies contemplate this route, they are urged
to take account of risk avoidance's numerous and serious perils. Unless
proponents of risk avoidance can provide a satisfactory response to these
concerns, legislatures ought not depart from-and courts ought to see that
agencies uphold--current commitments to risk reduction.
Part I of this Article describes the rise of risk avoidance as a regulatory
tool. It distinguishes risk avoidance approaches from risk reduction
strategies, and it provides several examples of risk avoidance, focusing on
fish and wildlife consumption advisories; use-restricted cleanups and
institutional controls; and ozone alerts. It then highlights the fact that risk
avoidance measures shift the regulatory focus from the sources of pollution
to its human receptors and discusses some of the consequences of this
2007]
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Part II of this Article explores the promise and the perils of risk
avoidance. This Part canvasses the arguments for and against increased
reliance on risk avoidance in lieu of risk reduction. It concludes that, on
balance, risk avoidance will be inappropriate in most instances. It closes by
recognizing that risk avoidance may nonetheless seem appealing and that
decision makers will be called upon to evaluate the competing claims in
particular instances.
Part III of this Article discusses the process for evaluating risk
avoidance. It observes that we need a mode of analysis that reveals what is
at stake and for whom. It argues that cost-benefit analysis-a decisional
tool with ambitions to become the dominant mode of analysis in risk
regulation-is ill suited to the task. Finally, it ventures several
prescriptions for evaluation, undertaken as part of a debate that is reframed
to consider whether a given risk, with its attendant possibilities for
avoidance, is morally, culturally, and socially acceptable.
I. THE RISE OF RISK AVOIDANCE
Government decision makers have increasingly come to rely on risk
avoidance as a form of risk regulation. Risk avoidance has been enlisted in
numerous contexts, supplanting risk reduction in whole or in part. This Part
describes the rise of risk avoidance, as well as the features that set this
approach apart from standard regulatory efforts to prevent, limit, or clean
up environmental contamination.
A. Risk Avoidance
Environmental contaminants continue to pollute the air, water, soil, and
sediments. Once released into the environment, they behave in various
ways. Many of these contaminants remain present and available in amounts
toxic to humans and other living things. The resulting threat to human
health (and, in some instances, ecological health) is the subject of
environmental risk regulation. Risk here is the product of the toxicity of a
particular contaminant and the duration and frequency of human exposure
to that contaminant. Human exposure occurs via numerous pathways: we
inhale contaminants in the air we breathe; we absorb through our skin
contaminants in the soil with which we work and play; and we ingest
contaminants that have bioaccumulated in the fish we eat.
Risk regulation in the environmental context has focused, until
recently, on risk reduction. Under this approach, risks are reduced by
[Vol. 31:273
HeinOnline  -- 31 Vt. L. Rev. 276 2006-2007
No Mud Pies
targeting the first link in the chain that connects environmental
contamination to adverse health effects for humans and the environment.
Such regulatory efforts seek to eliminate the sources of risks, i.e.,
environmental contaminants. Risk reduction strategies thus look to risk-
producers and require them to prevent, limit, or clean up environmental
contamination. These risk-producers might be compelled, for example, to
clean up mercury in the sediments of Onondaga Lake, given that
methylmercury bioaccumulates in fish and is a source of exposure to
humans and other wildlife. 4 Or risk-producers might be permitted to emit
only very limited quantities of ozone precursors to the air in the Los
Angeles basin, given the perennially poor air quality in the region.5 What
risk reduction strategies have in common is that they allocate the
responsibility for addressing risks to those who produce environmental
contamination.
Increasingly, however, government decision makers are relying on risk
avoidance. Under this approach, risks are addressed by intervening late in
the chain, breaking the link at the point of human exposure. Risk avoidance
strategies leave contamination unabated. Instead, they target the human
"receptors." That is, they look to those whose practices or lifeways expose
them to contamination and require these individuals to take steps to alter
their ways, thereby "avoiding" the risk. For example, these risk-bearers
might be asked to move from their homes or homelands to avoid contact
with soils contaminated with lead. They might be advised to stay indoors
on "ozone alert" days to avoid breathing poor quality air, particularly if they
are asthmatic, elderly, or otherwise sensitive to air pollution. They might
be admonished to refrain from breastfeeding or to cease consuming fish to
avoid exposing their infant children to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) or
other bioaccumulative contaminants in nearby waters. They might be
warned to alter traditional tending, gathering, and weaving practices to
avoid absorbing or ingesting pesticides applied to areas in which basketry
materials grow. What risk avoidance strategies have in common is that they
allocate the responsibility for addressing risks to those who bear the risks of
exposure to environmental contamination.
4. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION & REGION 2, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
RECORD OF DECISION, ONONDAGA LAKE BoTToM SUBSITE OF THE ONONDAGA LAKE SUPERFUND SITE
(2005), available at http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/der/projects/ondlake/onondagalakerod.pdf.
5. See, e.g., AM. LUNG ASS'N, STATE OF THE AIR: 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.califomialung.org/downloads/sota04_ca.pdf (finding that the Los Angeles, Long Beach, and
Riverside area "remains the most ozone-polluted city in the nation," as it has been for some years).
2007]
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B. Examples of Risk Avoidance as Risk Regulation
Government decision makers have employed risk avoidance in several
regulatory contexts. This section focuses on three contexts in which risk
avoidance has become a fixture: fish and wildlife consumption advisories;
use-restricted cleanups and institutional controls; and ozone alerts.
1. Fish and Wildlife Consumption Advisories
A litany of toxic substances has been, and continues to be, released into
the environment, thereby contaminating aquatic ecosystems.6 Many of
these contaminants are persistent and bioaccumulative, existing in
increasing concentrations in organisms higher up the "food chain."
Humans who consume fish and wildlife that are part of this food chain are
exposed to these contaminants. Indeed, fish consumption is the single
greatest source of human exposure to mercury 7 and PCBs. 8  Fish
consumption is also a significant source of exposure to chlordane, dioxins,
DDT, and numerous other contaminants. 9
Fish consumption advisories are directed to people who would
consume fish from contaminated waters, particularly those subpopulations
likely to suffer adverse effects given the contaminants at issue. Advisories
typically provide information about the nature and extent of the
contamination (e.g., indicating the water bodies affected and the fish
species implicated) and its adverse health effects (e.g., noting whether the
contaminants of concern are carcinogens, neurodevelopmental toxins, etc.).
6. See, e.g., REGION 10, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH
CONTAMINANTS SURVEY 1996-1998 (n.d.), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/rIO/oea.nsf/0703bc6b0c5525b088256bdc0076fc44/c3a9164ed269353788256c0
9005d36b7/$FILE/Fish%20Study.PDF (detecting ninety-two contaminants in Columbia River Basin
fish); OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH ASSESSMENTS, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, EVALUATION OF
CONTAMINANTS IN FISH FROM LAKE WASHINGTON, KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON (2004), available at
http://www.doh.wa.gov/ehp/oehas/publicationspdf/lake-wa contaminants-in fish King-09-2004.pdf
(finding DDTs, PCBs, and mercury in Lake Washington fish).
7. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, MERCURY UPDATE: IMPACT ON FISH
ADVISORIES 3 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/ost/fishadvice/mercupd.pdf [hereinafter EPA,
MERCURY UPDATE] ("Fish and other seafood products are the main source of methylmercury in the diet
.... .).
8. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: POLYCHLORINATED
BIPHENYLS (PCBS) UPDATE: IMPACT ON FISH ADVISORIES 2 (1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/fish/pcbs.pdf [hereinafter EPA, PCBS UPDATE] (reporting that fish are
the main dietary source of PCBs).
9. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY: 2004 NATIONAL LISTING OF FISH
ADVISORIES 4-5 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/fish/advisories/fs2004.pdf
[hereinafter EPA, FISH CONSUMPTION ADVISORIES] (reporting fish advisory numbers for mercury,
PCBs, chlordane, dioxins, DDT, and other contaminants).
[Vol. 31:273
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Advisories then recommend avoidance by one or more of several means
(e.g., refraining altogether from eating a particular species; reducing the
amount of fish over a certain size or age that is consumed; substituting
alternate fishing sites; or altering preparation methods).
Fish and wildlife consumption advisories currently blanket the waters
of the United States. According to the most recent tally, 35% of the lake
acreage and 24% of the river miles in the United States were under advisory
in 2004 for one or more pollutants.'0 This represents a total of 14,285,062
lake acres and 839,441 river miles." In addition, the entirety of the Great
Lakes and their connecting waters were under advisory in 2004, as were
roughly 65% of coastal waters.' 2 The geographic reach of fish consumption
advisories, moreover, has expanded continuously since the EPA began
providing such data in 1993.1"
Although agencies continue to characterize advisories as regrettable or
temporary responses to contamination, they now occupy an important, and
seemingly permanent, place on agencies' risk management rosters. EPA,
for example, has maintained that fish consumption advisories are a
temporary means to address human health risks while risk reduction is
pursued with vigor, claiming that "[n]o one wants consumption advisories
in place any longer than necessary.' 14 Yet agencies' deeds often belie such
claims. Advisories have been in effect in some places since the 1970s.' 5
And in 2001, the EPA joined the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
issuing the first national fish consumption advisory (due to mercury
10. EPA, FISH CONSUMPTION ADVISORIES, supra note 9, at 2. These numbers exclude the
Great Lakes and their connecting waters. Id at 3.
11. Id at 2.
12. Id. at 3. The figure for coastal waters excludes Alaska because it has no advisories. Id
13. Id. at 2. Note that improved assessment on the part of agencies and continued vigilance by
affected people provide a partial explanation for the increase in advisories' number and coverage. In
recent years, agencies have gathered data on a larger sample offish tissue from a larger sample of water
bodies, finding levels of contamination warranting advisories in a greater number of instances.
Nonetheless, a shift in agencies' acceptance of risk avoidance strategies likely also helps to explain the
increase. Catherine A. O'Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimination, and Environmental Justice for
Indigenous Peoples, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10 (2003) [hereinafter O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and
Indigenous Peoples].
14. Elizabeth Southerland of the EPA's Office of Water opened the 2001 National Forum on
Contaminants in Fish with this declaration. ELIZABETH SOUTHERLAND, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL FORUM OF CONTAMINANTS IN FISH, MAY 6 & 9, 2001, 1-10 (2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ost/fish/forum/fishforum.pdf. See generally O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and
Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13, at 10 (discussing agencies' increasing embrace of fish consumption
advisories, in deed if not in word).
15. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING CHEMICAL
CONTAMINANT DATA FOR USE IN FISH ADVISORIES, VOLUME IV: RISK COMMUNICATION 1 (1995)
[hereinafter EPA, RISK COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE].
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contamination). 16  But four years later, EPA declined to issue a rule
governing mercury emissions from coal-fired utilities that required
meaningful risk reduction, preferring instead to refer those exposed to fish
consumption advisories.
In fact, this rule, the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), is illustrative of
agency reliance on risk avoidance in the form of fish consumption
advisories.' 7 The CAMR was widely expected to require a 90% reduction
in mercury emissions from coal-fired utilities-from approximately forty-
eight tons per year to five tons per year. This reduction was to be achieved
within three years, i.e., by 2007, consistent with the Clean Air Act's (CAA)
provisions for air toxics under section 112.18 As such, it would have
required significant reductions from the largest remaining unregulated
source of mercury, a toxic air pollutant with neurodevelopmental and other
adverse effects on human health.' 9 Instead, in May 2005, EPA issued a rule
that requires only a 50% reduction in mercury emissions, and not until 2020
at the earliest. 20  To do so, EPA undertook a novel-and legally
questionable-interpretation of the CAA that substitutes a cap-and-trade
approach for the two-tiered strategy set forth in section 112, which couples
initial technology-based requirements with a residual risk-based approach.2'
In fact, as a consequence of emissions trading, EPA's rule is likely to
permit localized instances of increased contamination.22 Given that its rule
16. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT MERCURY IN FISH AND
SHELLFISH: 2004 EPA AND FDA ADVICE FOR WOMEN WHO MIGHT BECOME PREGNANT, WOMEN WHO
ARE PREGNANT, NURSING MOTHERS, AND YOUNG CHILDREN, available at
http://www.epa.gov/ost/fishadvice/advice.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006) [hereinafter EPA, MERCURY
ADVISORY FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN].
17. Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,642 (May 18, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72,
75) (finalizing the Clean Air Mercury Rule). See generally Catherine A. O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and
Justice, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,070, 11,106 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter O'Neill, Mercury,
Risk, and Jvutice] (documenting the fact that EPA's Clean Air Mercury Rule leaves many in the United
States inadequately protected, instructing those most exposed to undertake risk avoidance).
18. O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 17, at 11,081 (citation omitted).
19. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, TOXICOLOGICAL EFFECTS OFMETHYLMERCURY 175-81 (2000).
20. Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,619.
21. See Lisa Heinzerling & Rena L Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush
Administration, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,297, 10,297-98, 10,305 (April 2004) [hereinafter
Heinzerling & Steinzor, Perfect Storm 1] (chronicling mercury regulation under the Bush
Administration, focusing on scientific and legal issues); Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect
Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, Part II, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,485,
10,486-87 (June 2004) [hereinafter Heinzerling & Steinzor, Perfect Storm 11] (chronicling mercury
regulation under the Bush Administration, focusing on economic and fairness issues).
22. O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 17, at 11,098 ("[H]ot spots exist where
trading perpetuates or exacerbates localized instances of relatively high mercury deposition,
[methylmercury] bioavailability or [methylmercury] exposure.").
[Vol. 31:273
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does little to reduce mercury emissions and may even increase mercury
emissions in some areas, EPA recognized that the CAMR fails to reduce the
risks of mercury contamination to many of those exposed.23 So EPA
instructs those affected, particularly children and women of childbearing
age, to consult fish consumption advisories and reduce or eliminate fish
from their diets accordingly.24 Thus, rather than seek fully to reduce the
risks to those who regularly consume fish by decreasing the amount of
mercury emitted into the environment, the rule shifts responsibility to these
people to avoid the risk by altering their fish consumption practices. The
burden of undertaking avoidance here falls on all those who consume fish
in greater amounts or who consume different species from different waters
than "the typical U.S. consumer"25 assumed by the EPA-among them
Native Americans, Southeast Asian Americans, and low-income
subsistence fishers. 6
In a similar vein, EPA has to date declined to disapprove Oregon's
water quality standards, which employ a fish consumption rate that
seriously underprotects those who regularly consume fish, particularly
members of Oregon's various fishing tribes.27 In May 2004, the Oregon
Environmental Quality Commission adopted revisions to Oregon's water
quality standards, pursuant to section 303 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).28
These water quality standards form the basis of numerous regulatory
decisions. Among other things, water quality standards drive the
concentration of pollutants permitted to be discharged by sources under the
23. Id. at 11,106-07.
24. See Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,642.
In response to potential risks of consuming fish containing elevated
concentrations of (mercury], EPA and the [FDA] have issued a joint fish
consumption advisory which provides recommended limits on consumption of
certain fish species ... . This joint EPA and FDA advisory recommends that
women who may become pregnant, pregnant women, nursing mothers, and young
children to (sic) avoid some types of fish.., and [check] any local advisories that
may exist for local rivers and streams.
Id.
25. Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the
Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Steam-Generating Units; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4,652, 4,658 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). This "typical U.S. consumer," EPA assures, "is not in danger of
consuming harmful levels of methylmercury from fish and is not advised to limit fish consumption." Id.
26. Id. at 4,709.
27. E-mail from Adrianne Allen, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Catherine O'Neill, author (Dec.
8, 2006).
28. Or. Admin. R. 340-041-0033 (2000); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c) (2000).
2007]
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National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).29 Water
quality standards serve as "applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements" (ARARs) for federal- or state-led cleanups.30 Water quality
standards also determine whether waters are "impaired" within the meaning
of the CWA section 303(d) process.3 ' The EPA recently issued a revised
methodology governing the process by which states and tribes set water
quality standards.32 Important among the changes ushered in by the revised
methodology is EPA's move away from a single, national default value for
the fish consumption rate to be employed in developing water quality
standards meant to protect human health. Rather, "EPA strongly
emphasizes that States ... should consider developing criteria to protect
highly exposed population groups and use local or regional data... as more
representative of their target population group(s). 33 EPA therefore instated
a four-part hierarchy, preferring, in order: (1) the use of local data; (2) the
use of data reflecting consumption by groups similar in terms of geography
and population; (3) the use of selected data from national surveys; and (4)
the use of national default intake rates supplied by EPA.34 At the time of its
decision, Oregon had in hand quantitative surveys and other data of the first
sort, including a survey conducted by the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission and sponsored in part by the EPA.35 Notably, these local data
documented fish consumption for the Columbia River Basin tribes at
several times the rate of the general population described by the EPA
default values.36 Despite this documentation, Oregon employed the EPA
default fish consumption rate for the general population of 17.5
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
30. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. § 962 1(d) (2000).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2000).
32. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, METHODOLOGY FOR DERIVING
AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH 1-1 (2000), available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/humanhealth/method/complete.pdf [hereinafter EPA, AWQC
METHODOLOGY] ("These 304(a) criteria may be used as guidance by States and authorized Tribes to
establish water quality standards, which ultimately provide a basis for controlling discharges or releases
of pollutants into ambient waters.").
33. Id. at 4-24, 4-25.
34. Id. at 4-25.
35. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM'N, TECHNICAL REPORT 94-3, A FISH
CONSUMPTION SURVEY OF THE UMATILLA, NEz PERCE, YAKAMA, AND WARM SPRINGS TRIBES OF THE
COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN (1994) [hereinafter CRIFTC]; see also Stuart G. Harris & Barbara L. Harper, A
Native American Exposure Scenario, 17 RISK ANALYSIS 789, 790 (1997) (describing the potential
exposure to traditional Columbia River Basin tribal members for subsistence activities and quantifying
fish consumption for this population).
36. See CRIFTC, supra note 35 (revealing a mean consumption rate of 63.2 grams/day, a 99th
percentile rate of 389 grams/day, and a maximum rate of 972 grams/day). See Harris & Harper, supra
note 35, at 791 (documenting an average consumption at 540 grams/day).
[Vol. 31:273
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grams/day.37 Moreover, Oregon did so in the face of this and other
evidence brought to its attention by the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation and against the advice of the Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality's (ODEQ) own Technical Advisory Committee. 3
Under the Clean Water Act, EPA must approve or disapprove a state's
water quality standards.39 Although Oregon's standards invoked the least-
preferred option,40 and may well run afoul of the tribes' treaty rights and a
host of other legal obligations,4' EPA has so far declined to disapprove
them. EPA has, thereby, let stand water quality standards in Oregon that
will fail to reduce the risks of contamination to all those who consume fish
at rates greater than the national default, that is, all those who eat more than
roughly one fish meal every two weeks. Thus, EPA leaves it to these
individuals to take steps to protect themselves by decreasing their fish
consumption to the levels assumed by Oregon's standards, or else face the
risks from a host of toxic contaminants, including carcinogens such as
dioxins and PCBs.
2. Use-Restricted Cleanups and Institutional Controls
Toxic substances released in the past have left a legacy of
contaminated surface water, sediments, groundwater, and soils at hundreds
37. Martin S. Fitzpatrick, Toxic Compounds Criteria 1999-2003 Water Quality Standards
Review: Issue Paper H-76 (2004), available at
http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/standards/ToxicsEQCDocs/AttachmentHToxicsCriterialssuePaperfina.p
df.
38. The efforts of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation and the advice of
the ODEQ's Technical Advisory Committee are described in the administrative complaint filed with
EPA under its regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by which CTUIR
alleged that ODEQ used federal funds to implement regulations having a discriminatory effect on the
basis of race, color, and/or national origin. See Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation,
Title VI Administrative Complaint (June 9, 2005) (on file with the author) [hereinafter CTUIR]; see also
FITZPATRICK, supra note 37, at H-36 (noting that the Technical Advisory Committee had formally
recommended a three-tiered system, whereby Oregon's waters would be divided according to "fishing
intensity," with criteria for "low intensity" waters to be set using a 17.5 grams/day fish consumption
rate, for "medium intensity" waters to be set using a 142.4 grams/day fish consumption rate, and for
"high intensity" waters, including waters fished by tribal fishers, to be set using a 389 grams/day fish
consumption rate).
39. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(cX3) (2000); U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency Water Programs, 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2005).
40. Indeed, ODEQ opted for the very least protective among even EPA's default values,
eschewing EPA's default value for "subsistence fishers," which is 142.4 grams/day, in favor of the
default value for the "general population," at 17.5 grams/day. EPA, AWQC METHODOLOGY, supra note
32, at 4-26.
41. See, e.g., CTUIR, supra note 38; Catherine A. O'Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest: The
Right to Catch and Consume Fish, Presentation at the 2006 EPA-Tribal Leaders Summit (Aug. 23,
2006) (transcript on file with the CTUIR) [hereinafter O'Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest].
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of sites around the United States. These substances or their chemical
successors behave in various ways in the environment, lingering or
migrating, biodegrading or bioaccumulating. Ultimately, humans living
within or near contaminated sites may be exposed to contaminants via a
variety of pathways. For example, they might ingest groundwater
contaminated with trichloroethylene (TCE); they might ingest sediments,
soil, and dust laced with lead; or they might ingest mother's milk laden with
PCBs.
For over two decades, environmental agencies have worked under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) 42 and other statutes to clean up and restore contaminated sites.
Although the cleanup process has been understood from the outset to raise
complex questions of degree, agencies have nonetheless been guided by a
focus on risk reduction. Thus, they have aimed permanently to clean up
contamination to a level sufficient to protect the health of humans who
might in the future live at and use the resources of the site.43  In fact,
CERCLA includes an explicit preference for long-term, permanent
treatment, as opposed to temporary measures or mere containment of the
contaminants at a site."
Since the mid-1990s, however, agencies have increasingly fashioned
"use-restricted" cleanups, altering the cleanup baseline to allow some
amount of contamination to remain at the site, undiminished in quantity or
toxicity, while looking to institutional controls to restrict future uses of the
site. Institutional controls refer to an array of legal, administrative, or
institutional devices that urge or require people to limit their contact with
the contaminants left in place.45  Such devices take the form of fences,
warning signs, zoning measures, easements, restrictive covenants,
reversionary interests, and prohibitions or restrictions on resource use.
46
Institutional controls function within a paradigm of use-restricted cleanups,
whereby the future uses of a portion or the entirety of a site are limited to
42. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000).
43. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(A) (2005) (describing one of nine criteria for evaluating alternatives for the "overall
protection of human health and the environment").
44. See CERCLA § 962 1(b)(1) (preferring options that "permanently and significantly reducefl
the volume, toxicity or mobility of the hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants").
45. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STRATEGY TO ENSURE INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL
IMPLEMENTATION AT SUPERFUND SITEs 2 (2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/ic/icstrategy.pdf (defining institutional controls as "non-
engineered instruments, such as administrative and legal controls, that help to minimize the potential for
human exposure to contaminations and protect the integrity of the remedy").
46. Id.
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those uses that will result in little or no human contact with the
contaminants left in place.47  So long as the uses are adequately
circumscribed and the institutional controls appropriately maintained,
humans can avoid being exposed to the contaminants that remain.
Use-restricted cleanups and the institutional controls on which they
rely have proliferated in recent years. Institutional controls are often
important components-sometimes the sole component--of hundreds of
remedial efforts. Many state agencies and legislatures have hastened to
embrace institutional controls in the context of use-restricted cleanups,
particularly in the brownfields context.48  For example, whereas prior to
1994 Connecticut required that contaminated sites under its cleanup
program be restored to a "pristine" state, legislative changes now permit the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection to employ
"differentiated" or "flexible" cleanup standards based on the proposed
future uses of a site.49
At the federal level, too, institutional controls have come to play an
increasingly central role in cleanup efforts. Once viewed as interim
measures meant to limit human exposure until cleanup at a site could be
completed, agencies now rely on institutional controls in the long term, as a
partial or total substitute for cleanup.50  According to the National
47. See Alex Geisinger, Rethinking Risk-Based Environmental Cleanup, 76 IND. L.J. 367, 368-
69 (2001) ("[U]se-restricted cleanup pairs reduced removal or detoxification of materials at a
contaminated site with a limitation of use ensuring that the site will not be used in ways that will expose
people to the remaining contaminants."); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Legislative Innovation in State
Brownfields Redevelopment Programs, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 8 (2001) (explaining that use-
restricted cleanup involves leaving some contaminants on-site while restricting the use of the land to
minimize health risks). Use-restricted cleanup approaches may also be referred to as "risk-based,"
"differentiated," or "flexible," cleanups or referred to as "long-term stewardship" programs.
48. See, e.g., Geisinger, supra note 47, at 374-76 (noting the high cost of cleaning up
brownfields and discussing potential governmental responses); see also Gorovitz Robinson, supra note
47, at 10-15 (giving examples of various state agencies' responses to brownfields cleanup); John
Pendergrass, Sustainable Redevelopment of Brownfields: Using Institutional Controls to Protect Public
Health, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,243, 10,243 (May 1999) [hereinafter Pendergrass,
Redevelopment of Brownfields] (discussing mechanisms for blocking the pathways of exposure at
brownfield sites); Bradford C. Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs to Comply with Title V1, 24
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 115, 134-35 (2000) (noting that most states have statutes or regulations that
authorize agencies to consider future uses). To the extent that state legislatures have approved this shift
to risk avoidance following public debate, the shift in this context represents the exception to the rule
that the rise of risk avoidance has generally been unaccompanied by considered deliberation. Note that
such debate has not occurred in Congress, although use-restricted cleanups and institutional controls
have been embraced on the initiative of the relevant agency, EPA.
49. Gorovitz Robinson, supra note 47, at 12-13 (citation omitted).
50. Geisinger, supra note 47, at 371-76 (describing EPA's increased reliance on institutional
controls to supplement or supplant engineering controls and noting a paradigm shift among agencies in
general: "Rather than emphasizing removal or decontamination, regulators now consider whether
exposure can be limited."); Gorovitz Robinson, supra note 47, at 15 ("Although institutional controls
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Contingency Plan, EPA now expects to use institutional controls for both
short- and long-term management. 51 And EPA now commonly gauges the
extent of remediation it will require at a site to predictions of likely future
land uses.12 This enthusiasm for use-restricted cleanups and institutional
controls, moreover, appears likely to continue undampened in the future;
this is especially so in the brownfields context.53
Use restrictions and institutional controls guided cleanup, for example,
at the Agriculture Street Landfill (ASL) site in New Orleans, Louisiana.
For over half a century, until the late 1960s, the city of New Orleans used
the ninty-five acre site as a dump for everything from municipal waste to
the debris from Hurricane Betsy in 1965.24 Shortly after the landfill was
closed and covered over with a layer of sand, federal and local governments
supported the redevelopment of the property, locating residential
subdivisions, several small businesses, and the Moton Elementary School
on a portion of the site while leaving undeveloped another portion of the
site.55 In 1994, after tests revealed a host of contaminants at depths ranging
from two to more than thirty-two feet underground, EPA placed the site on
the National Priorities List (NPL) and began cleanup under CERCLA.56
EPA's cleanup plan called for replacing the top two feet of exposed soils in
the "developed" area and for leaving the contamination in place in the entire
forty-eight acre "undeveloped" portion of the site, covering the
contaminated soils there with one foot of clean fill, a geotextile mat, and
fencing the area.57 Cleanup according to this plan was undertaken in the
once were merely an interim measure used to protect people from exposure until a site cleanup was
complete, these controls are now used to provide long term protection from exposure, when total site
remediation is not contemplated.").
51. Geisinger, supra note 47, at 371.
52. See, e.g., OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
DIRECTIVE No. 9355.7-04, LAND USE IN CERCLA REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS 2, available at
http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/documents/land-use-cercla_remedy.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2006)
(directing EPA regional offices to determine the appropriate extent of remediation according to the
predicted future land uses of a site). For a summary of EPA's Directive No. 9355.7-04, see 60 Fed. Reg.
29,595 (June 5, 1995).
53. See, e.g., Charles Bartsch, Redeveloping Brownfields: Evaluating the Program and
Looking to the Future, 37 BNA ENV'T. REP. 206 (Jan. 27, 2006) (asserting that state and local
governments are continually encouraging brownfield reuse through economic incentives and other
"institutional controls").
54. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPERFUND RECORD OF DECISION: AGRICULTURE STREET
LANDFILL 1 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/rods/fulltext/r0602008.pdf
[hereinafter EPA, ASL ROD].
55. Id.
56. REGION 6, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AGRICULTURE STREET LANDFILL 1-2 (2006),
available at http://www.epa.gov/earthlr6/6sf/pdffiles/0600646.pdf [hereinafter REGION 6, EPA, ASL].
57. EPA, ASL ROD, supra note 54, at 4.
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late 1990s and deemed complete in 2002.58 According to the most recent
Public Health Consultation conducted by the Agency for Toxic Substances
Disease Registry (ATSDR), the undeveloped area of the site continued to
warrant classification as a "public health hazard," given the unacceptably
high levels of lead, arsenic, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)
present in the soil.59 The cap and the fence around the undeveloped area
were intended to ensure that humans, including over 1000 people living on
site in the adjacent residential areas, avoided the risks of exposure to these
toxic substances.60  There is evidence, however, that people remained at
risk, both from direct contact with contaminants remaining in the
undeveloped area and from the possibility that the toxic substances left in
place would contaminate (or recontaminate) surrounding areas. The
ATSDR noted that "[a]lthough entry to this area has been limited by a
fence, individuals continue to access this area and may come in contact with
the elevated levels of lead and arsenic in the soil."6' Additionally, "cars,
trucks, trailers and Mardi Gras parade floats" continued to be stored in the
fenced-in area.62  A site inspection conducted as part of a CERCLA-
mandated five-year review revealed that the soil had been disturbed in this
area, sometimes to a depth of six inches.63 Then, in September of 2005,
Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans, potentially carrying lead, asbestos,
and other contaminants to surrounding areas. 64
58. Id. at vii-viii.
59. AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES DISEASE REGISTRY, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, HEALTH CONSULTATION: AGRICULTURE STREET LANDFILL, NEW ORLEANS, ORLEANS
PARISH, LOUISIANA 1-2, available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/agriculturest/agrpl.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). In addition,
ATSDR noted that while the majority of the residential area and the community center posed "no
apparent public health hazard," there are "scattered pockets" of lead, arsenic, and PAHs in the soil in
these areas that would need to be addressed in order to prevent the possibility of human exposure to
unacceptable levels of these contaminants. Id. at 2.
60. REGION 6, EPA, ASL, supra note 56, at I (noting that over 1,000 people live on site,
housed in 179 Housing Authority of New Orleans town homes, 128 Gordon Plaza apartments, and sixty-
seven single-family residences).
61. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES DISEASE REGISTRY, supra note 59, at 1-2.
62. REGION 6, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FIVE-YEAR REVIEW REPORT FOR AGRICULTURE
STREET LANDFILL SUPERFUND SITE, NEW ORLEANS, ORLEANS PARISH, LOUISIANA 2 (2003), available
at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/fiveyear/f3-06001.pdf [hereinafter REGION 6, EPA, ASL FIVE-
YEAR REVIEW]; accord Deon Roberts, Residents Cry Foul After US. Superfund Cut, NEW ORLEANS
CITY Bus., Nov. 8, 2004 (observing that the practice of parking vehicles on this portion of the site
continued, despite residents' efforts to alert the New Orleans City Council).
63. REGION 6, EPA, ASL FIVE-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 62, at 2.
64. Juliet Eilperin, Flooded Toxic Waste Sites Are Potential Health Threat, WASH. POST, Sept.
10, 2005, at A15 (noting that environmental scientists at the time agreed that "it was likely the rush of
water, much of which remains trapped inside New Orleans, had infiltrated the waste [site] and absorbed
a range of the contaminants," and quoting Richard T. DiGiulo, head of Duke University's Superfund
Basic Research Center, who explained that "when a toxic site is flooded, the contaminants could seep
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Use restrictions and institutional controls also comprise an important
part of the remedy selected for the Bunker Hill Mining and Metallurgical
site in the Coeur d'Alene River Basin. The site covers a twenty-one square-
mile area surrounding the old Bunker Hill Company lead and zinc smelting
complex in Kellogg, Idaho as well as surrounding areas throughout the
1,500-square-mile "Coeur d'Alene River corridor, adjacent floodplains,
downstream water bodies, tributaries, and fill areas." 65 After a century of
mining, milling, and smelting activities, the smelter closed in 1981, leaving
a legacy of severe heavy metal contamination, including antimony, arsenic,
cadmium, lead, manganese, mercury, and zinc.66 EPA added the site to the
NPL in 1983, and cleanup activities have been ongoing since.67  The
contaminant of greatest concern at the site is lead, given its serious and
irreversible adverse effects on the cognitive and behavioral development of
young children exposed to even small amounts of lead.68 Children are
exposed when they ingest lead present in soils, sediments, and dust,
typically in the context of the ordinary hand-to-mouth contact characteristic
of childhood behavior.69 Cleanup at this massive site is complex, and an
array of remedial actions has been and will be undertaken over several
phases. Among the most urgent tasks was the need to address the
exceedingly high levels of lead contamination in city parks, school
playgrounds, and residential yards, as well as the consequent elevated blood
lead levels in children throughout the community.70 Beginning in 1989,
contaminated soils from residential yards were removed and replaced with a
barrier and clean fill; this process is ongoing.7' Following remediation,
into surface water and the surrounding soil"); see generally Brad Knickerbocker & Patrik Jonsson, New
Orleans' Toxic Tide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 8, 2005, at Al (discussing the various toxins in
the floodwaters after Hurricane Katrina).
65. REGION 10, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, BUNKER HILL MINING AND METALLURGICAL:
SITE DESCRIPTION (2006) [hereinafter REGION 10, EPA, BUNKER HILL SITE DESCRIPTION], available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/rl0/nplpad.nsf (follow "A. National Site Sheets" hyperlink; then follow
"Alphabetically" hyperlink; then follow "BUNKER HILL MINING & METALLURGICAL"
hyperlink).
66. Id.; COMM. ON SUPERFUND SITE ASSESSMENT & REMEDIATION IN THE COEUR D'ALENE
RIVER BASIN, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, SUPERFUND AND MINING MEGASITES: LESSONS FROM THE COEUR
D'ALENE RIVER BASIN 15, 41, 123 (2005) [hereinafter NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, SUPERFUND AND MINING
MEGASITES].
67. REGION 10, EPA, BUNKER HILL SITE DESCRIPTION, supra note 65.
68. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES DISEASE REGISTRY, DRAFT TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE
ON LEAD (1997). Lead is also classified by the EPA as a "probable human carcinogen." Id.
69. See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, SUPERFUND AND MINING MEGASITES, supra note 66, at
162.
70. REGION 10, EPA, BUNKER HILL SITE DESCRIPTION, supra note 65; REGION 10, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BUNKER HILL POPULATED AREAS FIRST FIVE YEAR REVIEW REPORT 9 (1999)
[hereinafter REGION 10, EPA, BUNKER HILL FIRST FIVE YEAR REVIEW].
71. Id.
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maintenance, and any re-remediation necessitated by recontamination (e.g.,
because of flooding, erosion, or redeposition of contaminated soils)
becomes the responsibility of the property owner.72 The remedy provides
for an "Institutional Controls Program," among other things to enforce
property owners' obligations to this end and to track permits for digging,
construction, and other activities that might affect the integrity of the
remediated areas." Throughout the site, warning signs are posted urging
individuals to "Protect Your Health. 74 Signs such as the one at Killarney
Lake, described above, greet the people who use the beaches, picnic areas,
and boat launches along the various lakes and rivers on the site.75 In each
instance, these signs direct people to curtail their activities and those of
their children in a variety of ways designed to limit their contact with the
lead and metals that remain in the soils and sediments.76
3. Ozone Alerts
Pollutants that are the precursors to tropospheric (ground-level)
ozone-oxides of nitrogen and volatile organic compounds--continue to be
emitted to the air, compromising air quality in a number of urban areas
throughout the United States. Humans are exposed to ground-level ozone
when they inhale the ambient air. Exposure to ground-level ozone has been
linked to reduced lung function, increased frequency of adverse respiratory
symptoms, and the development of asthma.77 The most recent data show
that exposure to even low levels of ozone is associated with an increased
rate of mortality.
78
72. REGION 10, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL FACT SHEET: BUNKER HILL
SITE, NORTHERN IDAHO I (June 2004),
http://yosemiteI .epa.gov/RIO/CLEANUP.NSF/46453efc0be3985c88256d140050c Iac/0aa63d9677fDa58
388256dIa007fac6f/$FILE/CDA%2ONKellogg/o20fs%205-27-04.pdf.
73. REGION 10, EPA, BUNKER HILL FIRST FIVE YEAR REVIEW, supra note 70, at 1.
74. NAT'L ACADS, supra note 1.
75. Id; accord Telephone Interview with Jerry Cobb, Panhandle Health District, Idaho (June
27, 2005).
76. NAT'L ACADS., supra note 1.
77. See, e.g., F. Broeckaert et al., Lung Epithelial Damage at Low Concentrations of Ambient
Ozone, 353 LANCET 900, 900 (1999) (linking ground-level ozone to reduced lung function, asthma, and
other chronic respiratory problems); Bert Brunekreef & Stephen T. Holgate, Air Pollution and Health,
360 LANCET 1233, 1233, 1236 (2002) (discussing the connection between particulate matter and ozone
and respiratory health); Rob McConnell et al., Asthma in Exercising Children Exposed to Ozone: A
Cohort Study, 359 LANCET 386, 386 (2002) (studying the relationship between outdoor exercise in
polluted areas and the development of asthma).
78. Michelle L. Bell et al., The Exposure-Response Curve for Ozone and Risk of Mortality and
the Adequacy of Current Ozone Regulations, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 532, 535 (2006), available at
http://www.ehponline.org/members/2006/8816/8816.pdf.
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Under the federal Clean Air Act, state environmental agencies were
long ago supposed to have required risk reduction sufficient to ensure
compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),
standards designed to protect human health.79 In many cases, however,
state agencies have still not fulfilled this duty.80 As a consequence, over
160 million people in the United States live in areas that do not comply
with federal air quality standards addressing smog.8 I In fact, the number of
people exposed to unhealthy levels of ozone may be even greater than this,
given data showing that standards more stringent than the new NAAQS
would be necessary to protect against premature mortality due to ozone.
82
Having failed to reduce pollution to levels dictated by the NAAQS,
agencies have turned to "ozone alerts," which they issue on days when
ozone levels are unsafe.83 These ozone alerts recommend that everyone-
particularly children, people with asthma or other respiratory conditions, the
elderly, and those who work or exercise outside--curtail their outdoor
activities during the day to avoid the adverse health effects of exposure.8
4
Agencies have relied on ozone alerts in some areas for decades.85
Some agencies, moreover, are devising ever more sophisticated warning
systems, even as efforts to prevent or control emissions of oxides of
nitrogen and volatile organic compounds lag. 6 The South Coast Air
79. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).
80. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, 8-HOUR GROUND-LEVEL OZONE DESIGNATIONS,
http://www.epa.gov/ozonedesignations (follow "State Designations" hyperlink; then search by EPA
region and state to find areas that did not meet the national primary or secondary air quality standards as
of April 15, 2004); see Thomas 0. McGarity, Missing Milestones: A Critical Look at the Clean Air Act's
VOC Emissions Reduction Program in Nonattainment Areas, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 41 (1999) (discussing
the failure of states to attain the national ambient air quality standards despite a series of extensions and
other efforts by Congress and the EPA to ease states' burdens).
81. Traci Watson, EPA Tells I in 7 U.S. Counties to Clean Up Smog, USA TODAY, Apr. 16-
18, 2004, at Al. It is estimated that some 100 million Americans live in areas that exceed even the
current ozone standard. OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, THE OZONE REPORT: MEASURING PROGRESS THROUGH 2003, 2 (2004), available at
http://epa.gov/air/airtrends/aqtmd04/ozone.html.
82. Bell et al., supra note 78, at 532, 535.
83. These advisories also go by other names, e.g., "smog alerts" or "clean air alerts."
84. Federal ozone index values range from "good" to "moderate," when it is recommended that
"[u]nusually sensitive people should consider limiting prolonged outdoor exertion," to "very unhealthy,"
when it is recommended that "[a]ctive children and adults, and people with respiratory disease such as
asthma should avoid all outdoor exertion" and "[e]veryone else should limit outdoor exertion." Id.
85. The South Coast Air Quality Management District, for example, has issued ozone alerts
since 1978. See, e.g., Matthew Neidell, Information and Avoidance Behavior: Do People Respond to
Smog Alerts? (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://economics.uchicago.edu/download/abidI 1104.pdf.
86. See, e.g., Steven D. Cook, Senators, Witnesses Say EPA Slow to Issue Rules, Guidance for
Meeting Air Standards, 218 BNA DAILY ENV'T. REP., Nov. 14, 2005, at Al, reprinted in 36 BNA
ENV'T REP. No. 45, Nov. 18, 2005, at 2,333-34 (discussing statements during Senate Environment and
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Quality Management District, for example, which regulates air quality in
the highly polluted Los Angeles metropolitan area, recently developed a
system that provides immediate electronic warnings to those at risk that
participate in the program.87
Agencies have allowed ozone alerts to supplant risk reduction,
moreover, despite evidence that the number of individuals who suffer from
asthma and other respiratory ailments triggered by exposure to ground-level
ozone has continued to climb.88 Currently, some 20 million Americans-
including more than 6 million children-have asthma.89  Studies in the
United States have shown that emergency room visits due to asthma
increase when ozone and/or particulate matter pollution are even slightly
above levels permitted by the NAAQS. 90
In these and other contexts, government decision makers are turning to
risk avoidance rather than risk reduction.9' In its forest management efforts,
for example, the United States Forest Service relies on herbicide contact
warnings to elicit avoidance from members of the various California tribes,
who are exposed to herbicide residues when they tend, harvest, prepare, and
weave plants in the process of making baskets.92 In their efforts to regulate
Public Works Subcommittee hearing that EPA's "slow pace" in issuing rules and guidance has hindered
progress in attaining air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter).
87. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Board Meeting Minutes, Pager Alert Pilot
Survey, tbl.l (Dec. 10, 1999), available at http://www.aqmd.gov/hb/1999/991210a.html; see also Jack
McCarthy, Pagers to Carry Smog Alert-Instant Warning System Being Developed for People at Risk,
PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Sept. 17, 1998, at Al (quoting South Coast Air Quality Management District board
member Roy Wilson: "We felt we needed a way to tell people who are ill or at the playground when the
air is very bad, so they would know they had better go indoors.").
88. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
ASTHMA PREVALENCE, HEALTH CARE USE AND MORTALITY, 2002,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hestats/asthma/asthma.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
89. Id.
90. Paige Tolbert et al., Air Quality and Pediatric Emergency Room Visits for Asthma in
Atlanta, Georgia, 151 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 798 (2000); Mary C. White et al., Exacerbations of
Childhood Asthma and Ozone Pollution in Atlanta, 65 ENVTL. RES. 56, 62-63 (1994).
91. For additional examples, see O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra note
13, at 17-20.
92. The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) has opted to apply herbicides containing glyphosate,
hexazinone, and triclopyr to recently logged or burned areas, in the process affecting native plants that
are culturally important to the various California tribes and used for food, medicine, and basketry
materials. Because these herbicide residues persist for up to 130 weeks, the California Department of
Pesticides Regulation (CDPR) has issued warnings to California tribes and their members, who are
exposed to the herbicides when they tend, harvest, prepare, and weave the plants in the process of
making baskets. LIN YING LI, CAL. DEP'T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, DATA ANALYSIS OF FORESTRY
HERBICIDE RESIDUES IN PLANTS OF INTEREST TO CALIFORNIA TRIBES 8-9 (2002). The USFS has
embraced such "herbicide treatment programs" even as CDPR has "acknowledged that California tribal
members' unique exposure scenarios are unaccounted for in the risk assessments conducted to set the
parameters for use of these herbicides." See O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra
note 13, at 15-17.
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agricultural pesticides, federal and state agencies have issued standards that
require farmworkers to observe a certain waiting period or "entry interval"
before re-entering fields that have been sprayed with pesticides and have
undertaken educational efforts, among other things, to get farmworkers to
take steps to avoid taking home contaminated clothing or equipment that
would expose their children to the pesticides with which they work.93 State
and local governments rely on beach advisories and closures when bacterial
contamination-resulting in the main from combined sewer overflows and
sanitary sewer overflows-renders swimming, surfing, and other
recreational activities unsafe for humans.94 State and local governments
similarly look to "boil-water notices" to address bacterial contamination of
drinking water sources. 95
Moreover, there is a real prospect of increasing calls for risk avoidance
in the future. This is so in part because risk avoidance is likely to continue
to appeal to those seeking to "reform" risk regulation along various lines.
Calls for increased reliance on risk avoidance have come primarily from
regulated industries that stand to reap the benefits of any cost savings from
scaled-back risk reduction.96 However, these calls might find theoretical
93. See discussion infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. Note that EPA and other
agencies have embraced this approach despite evidence that these standards are inadequate to protect
children, who are often present in the fields alongside their parents. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PESTICIDES: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FARMWORKERS AND THEIR
CHILDREN (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rcooo40.pdf (stating that EPA did not
design entry intervals for children under 12); Eileen Gauna, Farmworkers as an Environmental Justice
Issue. Similarities and Differences, 25 ENvIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 67, 68-69 (2002) (discussing
standards for pesticide safety that are inadequate to protect children's health). Note, too, that agencies
and legislatures have embraced this approach in the face of public requests that several pesticides be
phased out and, ultimately, banned in favor of alternatives that are less toxic to farmworkers. See, e.g.,
Shannon Dininny, Debate over Pesticides, Exposure Growing Again, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 21, 2005, http:l/seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/212874_gcenter2 1 .html (noting the controversy over
a bill in Washington state that would "phase out certain pesticides by 2012").
94. According to the EPA's most recent assessment of recreational beaches in the U.S. "of the
4,025 beaches that were monitored in 2005, 1,109 or 28 percent had at least one advisory or closing
during the 2005 season." U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA'S BEACH PROGRAM: 2005 SWIMMING
SEASON UPDATE, available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/beaches/seasons/2005/2005fs.pdf. I am
indebted to Bill Rodgers for this example. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Improving Laws, Declining
World: The Tort of Contamination, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2004) (discussing the magnitude
and source of beach closures since 1988).
95. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER ON TAP: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (2003),
available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/wot/pdfs/book-waterontapfull.pdf (indicating that water
suppliers shall issue a warning when EPA standards are violated); see also Rodgers, supra note 94, at
1254 (noting that in a recent four-year period, "725 communities have issued 'boil-water notices'
affecting three million people").
96. See THOMAS 0. MCGARrrY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL
GAMES USED TO SUBVERT RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 3-4, 9-10 (2004) (arguing that regulated
industries popularize a vision of regulation driven primarily by economic efficiency models, despite the
serious shortcomings of these models).
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moorings among proponents of economic efficiency as the aim of risk
regulation. 97 These proponents may need little convincing that it would be
more efficient to shift the burden to individual risk-bearers to protect
themselves from a wide variety of pollution risks.
As well, risk avoidance may be seen as increasingly feasible, given the
likely increasing availability of information-including genetic
information-identifying individuals' circumstances in terms of
susceptibility and exposure. This information would allow the
responsibility for avoiding risks to be shifted and avoidance measures
increasingly tailored to these individual risk-bearers. 98 Indeed, in view of
such developments, Dan Tarlock has recently suggested that we revisit the
assumption that "it would be unfair and inefficient to shift the burden of
protection to [individual risk-bearers] for a wide variety of pollution
risks." 99 Citing the work of the Environmental Genome Project, he has
observed that we will increasingly have the tools at hand to hold individuals
responsible for avoiding or mitigating the environmental risks they face. 00
Thus, he has ventured, these individuals might be required to move their
place of residence, to stay indoors, to refrain from certain activities or
pursuits, or to undergo medical monitoring or even prophylactic
surgeries. 101
Risk avoidance's promise and perils will be explored in Part II. Before
turning to this task, it is necessary to highlight a unique feature of this
regulatory approach: the nexus between risk avoidance and human
exposure.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Genetic Susceptibility and Environmental Risk Assessment: An
Emerging Link, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,277, 10,277-78 (2000) (observing that the
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences' Environmental Genome Project is working to
identify the 200 or so genes believed to determine human susceptibility to environmentally induced
diseases and suggesting that risk avoidance might therefore be relied upon more heavily as a regulatory
tool); ENVTL. GENOME PROJECT RESEARCH ACTIVITIES, PESTICIDE ExPOSURE AND NEUROLOGIC
FUNCTION IN FARMWORKERS, available at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/envgenom/abstract/z0149020.htm
(discussing research underway to assess neurologic effects of chronic low-level exposure to pesticides in
farmworkers, evaluating, among other things, the role of genetic susceptibility); see generally Jamie A.
Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health, 93 CAL. L. REV. 171 (2005)
(describing the potential effect of increased access to genetic data on environmental policy and risk
assessment). Cf David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution for Environmental
Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 17 (2005).
99. Tarlock, supra note 98, at 10,277.
100. Id. at 10,280.
101. Id. at 10,277-80.
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C. Requisites for Risk Avoidance
With risk avoidance, the locus of regulatory activity shifts from source
to receptor, from the entities and processes that produce environmental
contaminants to the humans that are exposed to them. This shift has several
consequences for government decision makers' role in risk regulation. A
shift to risk avoidance requires ascertaining the possible means for
avoidance and communicating the need for avoidance to those who are
exposed. In order to do a colorable job of each of these tasks, decision
makers must identify with precision those likely to be exposed.
In order to fashion risk avoidance strategies, government decision
makers must first identify the options for avoidance. If the contaminant of
concern is ground-level ozone in the Los Angeles air basin, the resulting
risk of respiratory distress in adult asthmatics might be avoided by having
those exposed stay indoors, by having them wear a respirator whenever
they go outside, by having them move their place of residence or work to a
region with better air quality, or by having them cease breathing. If the
contaminant of concern is methylmercury in walleye caught in particular
Wisconsin lakes, the resulting risk of adverse neurodevelopmental effects in
children might be avoided by having their mothers eat other species of fish
caught elsewhere, by having them eliminate fish from their diet entirely for
their childbearing years, or by having them cease breastfeeding their
infants. Which, if any, of these options is plausibly among the means for
avoidance, of course, depends on the extent to which the practice or lifeway
that exposes humans to risk is valued or thought to be essential and on the
extent to which the prescribed avoidance measure is costly, burdensome, or
thought to be impossible in the sense of occasioning profound anguish or
encroaching on important values or rights.
10 2
A shift to risk avoidance also requires communicating the need for
avoidance to those exposed. In order to rely on risk avoidance, government
decision makers need to ensure that those exposed have been apprised of
the need for avoidance and of the means for doing so. This communication
effort requires health and environmental agencies to develop a knowledge
of-and, ideally, a relationship with-the exposed subpopulation, group, or
community. 103 In the first place, agencies need to determine to whom to
102. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous
Peoples, supra note 13, at 28-40.
103. See, e.g., NAT'L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, FISH CONSUMPTION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 107-27 (2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/fish consumpreport_1 1-2/pdf [hereinafter
NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT] (discussing risk communication and fish consumption advisories).
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address their message-risk communicators refer to this as their "target
audience."' 4 Who fishes the waters of the Columbia Slough in Portland,
Oregon? Who lives within the boundaries of the Bunker Hill Mining and
Metallurgical Site? Who works in the fields and orchards in Eastern
Washington? Once the particular audience is identified, agencies need to
determine how those exposed receive information, i.e., in which language
and via which media or informal channels. 10 5 Do they read English? Do
they have access to the Internet? Are they required to obtain a fishing
license (and any accompanying literature) from the state-and do they in
practice?
In order to meet these requisites, government decision makers seeking
to rely on risk avoidance must identify-and attempt to learn a fair amount
about-those likely to be exposed. In a diverse society, different
subpopulations, groups, or communities may live their lives in different
ways, engaging in various practices or pursuits that expose them to
environmental contaminants. They might have different understandings-
perhaps profoundly different-about the value of the practices in question
and the ease or anguish with which one or another avoidance measure might
be undertaken. They might communicate about risk in diverse languages
and by multiple avenues. If government decision makers are to ascertain
the plausible options for risk avoidance, if they are to communicate
competently with those exposed-both necessary if they hope to secure the
behavioral changes that amount to avoidance 46---decision makers have to
learn a considerable amount about the people facing risks: who they are,
how they live, what they value. Indeed, government decision makers'
efforts here are often iterative and might be expected to continue to produce
and refine information about those exposed.
In fact, as more information about those exposed has been gathered,
various identifiable subpopulations have emerged as having particular
circumstances--circumstances that turn out to be relevant not only to
matters of implementation, but also to the prior determination whether to
employ risk avoidance in lieu of risk reduction. These subpopulations
104. See id. at 108, 114-16 (criticizing the use of the term "target audience" as indicating a one-
way flow of information rather than a two-way process); EPA, RISK COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE, supra
note 15, at 3 ("Depending on the potential health effects, different audiences of fish consumers will be
the targets of the risk communication efforts.").
105. See NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 117-21 (discussing the need
for appropriate message content and media).
106. See, e.g., EPA, RISK COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 2 (judging success of
fish consumption advisories by how many in the target audience have understood and complied with the
relevant advice); accord Pendergrass, Redevelopment of Brownfields, supra note 48, at 10,244 (noting
that institutional controls "operate by inducing humans to modify their behavior").
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include (but are not limited to): children, women of childbearing age,
asthmatics, fishing tribes, low-income individuals, farmworkers, and
various Asian-American and Pacific Islander groups. 10 7 The identity of the
subpopulations left to undertake avoidance may affect a societal assessment
of whether risk avoidance is appropriate and, in some cases, may implicate
various normative and positive legal commitments, points taken up later in
this Article.
Risk reduction strategies (at least those driven by human health),0 8 of
course, also require government decision makers to understand human
exposure and so to gather and respond to information identifying those
exposed.1°9 Standards directing risk-producers to prevent, limit, or clean up
contaminants, however, can be set with a less intimate knowledge of those
exposed. Because risk reduction does not rely on changing existing human
behaviors or lifeways, it can proceed without ascertaining which
alternatives are possible from whose perspective. By shifting the locus of
regulatory engagement, then, from sources of environmental contamination
to human receptors, risk avoidance reorients government decision makers'
efforts, demanding of them-and charging them with-knowledge of who
is at risk and what is at stake from the perspective of those at risk.' 0
II. RISK AVOIDANCE: PROMISE AND PERILS
There has not, to-date, been any systematic effort to consider and
justify a shift to risk avoidance. This lack of critical attention may be due,
in part, to the fact that risk avoidance strategies have only recently begun to
be categorized and discussed as such."' Risk avoidance strategies are often
107. See, e.g., EPA, RISK COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 27-41 (discussing
particular circumstances and needs of various groups that comprise "target audiences" for fish
consumption advisories); OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENvTL PROT. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: EPA
STUDIES ON SENSITIVE SUBPOPULATIONS AND DRINKING WATER CONTAMINANTS (1998), available at
http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/standard/rtcsensubpops.pdf (discussing life stage, gender, genetic traits,
health status, and exposure as factors relevant to the identification of sensitive subpopulations in the
context of drinking water regulation).
108. Risk reduction strategies might be health-based or technology-based. One of the
advantages of the latter is that regulation may proceed in the absence of complete data regarding the
toxicity of and mechanisms of exposure to the contaminants to be regulated. See Wendy E. Wagner,
The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 84-85 (2000) (discussing the
advantages of using technology-based standards for pollution control).
109. For further discussion of this claim and its implications when Native peoples are among
those exposed, see Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated
Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2000) [hereinafter O'Neill,
Variable Justice].
110. See discussion infra at Part III.
11. See, e.g., O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13, at 6 (noting the
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referred to by different names"l2 or discussed in terms of the particular
category of avoidance measures (e.g., "fish consumption advisories,"
"institutional controls") at issue. Often, risk avoidance is soft-pedaled by
proponents. The National Mining Association, for example, applauded the
EPA's decision in its Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) to rely on fish
consumption advisories in lieu of more substantial reductions in mercury
emissions from coal-fired utilities, advocating what it euphemistically
termed "dietary modification and education."' '3  Similarly, the Electric
Power Research Institute suggested that the effect of fish consumption
advisories in this context would be to "redirect consumption" away from
fish in water bodies with high levels of methylmercury, thus necessitating
even less protective standards than proposed by EPA.' 14 And, to the extent
that risk avoidance places responsibility on a relatively small (and often
politically disempowered) portion of the population-typically tribes and
their members, communities of color, and low-income communities-the
shift to risk avoidance is likely to go undetected and unexamined by the
majority of the population." 5
The lack of attention to this shift may also be due to the fact that risk
avoidance strategies are difficult to spot to the extent that they are enlisted
alongside strategies that require some degree of risk reduction-but that
stop short of reducing risks to levels that are safe, "acceptable," or
recent reliance on risk avoidance for environmental regulation affecting Native peoples' resources and
rights); CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 54 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor, eds., 2005) (calling for risk
reduction over risk avoidance).
112. The California Air Resources Board, for example, recently discussed measures to address
environmental factors contributing to the high incidence of asthma, discussing "primary" and
"secondary" strategies-the former referring to risk reduction, the latter to risk avoidance. CAL. AIR
RES. BD., EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION TO IDENTIFY CHRONIC EFFECTS OF AMBIENT AIR
POLLUTANTS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 275 (2004), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/abstracts/94-33 1.htm#Executive.
113. NAT'L MINING ASS'N, DOCKET No. OAR-2002-0056, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED
NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS (2004), available at
http://pubweb.epa.gov/mercury/pdfs/OAR-2002-0056-2434.pdf.
114. RICHARD CARLTON ET AL., ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST. (EPRI), DOCKET No. OAR-
2002-0056, EPRI COMMENTS ON EPA PROPOSED EMISSION STANDARDS/PROPOSED STANDARDS OF
PERFORMANCE, ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS: MERCURY EMISSIONS 124 (2004);
O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 17, at 11,108.
115. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, supra note 11l, at 42.
In many cases, the responsibility for avoiding the consequences of pollution can
be shifted to the victims without most people noticing. .. . It is relatively easy
for industries or the government to insist that risk reduction is the job of a
minority of citizens, since the majority of people either won't notice or won't
understand why there is a problem.
Id. See generally O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13, at 25 (discussing risk
avoidance and environmental justice).
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technologically achievable. EPA's CAMR provides an example, inasmuch
as it envisions some amount of mercury emissions reductions-albeit
greatly decreased and delayed. It is the risk that remains as a result of this
substantial reprieve to sources that must be avoided by those called upon to
change their fish consumption practices. Similarly, use-restricted cleanups
often employ institutional controls in lieu of cleanup at some portion of a
contaminated site, as is the case at the Agricultural Street Landfill site in
New Orleans, or in place of particular engineering controls that would
ensure some further increment of protection of human health. In these
instances, risk at the site is partially reduced; what remains, however, is left
to be avoided by those exposed.
Finally, the absence of a systematic justification may be due to the fact
that the shift to risk avoidance in some instances is subtle and proceeds
incrementally. Measures initially designed to provide temporary warning
of contamination while abatement proceeds apace remain in place for
decades, ultimately becoming a staple of agencies' "risk management"
efforts. Fish consumption advisories, as discussed above, are a case in
point. Agencies have in numerous instances presided over what Bill
Rodgers has termed "slow and sorry declines" in environmental quality-
the gradual erosion of nature's "baseline," facilitated by regulatory
compromises.116 These regulatory failures, Rodgers observes, have allowed
warning statements to become a "norm."'"17 EPA in this administration has
been especially bold in this regard: it has dragged its feet when required to
regulate by risk reduction, missing even court-ordered deadlines;" t8 it has
authorized compliance schedules for sources that postpone actual reductions
into the next decade and beyond;' 19 it has scaled back its own performance
116. Rodgers, supra note 94, at 1249. By way of example, Rodgers cites "the flurry of
regulatory compromises in EPA rulemakings [under the Toxic Substances Control Act] that secured
PCBs as a pollution problem that will not go away." Id. at 1257 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 1256-58.
118. See, e.g., Heinzerling & Steinzor, Perfect Storm I, supra note 21 (describing EPA's roles in
a series of missed statutory and court-ordered deadlines for its rule governing mercury emissions from
coal-fired utilities); U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SHOULD IMPROVE
THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS AIR ToxICs PROGRAM 15-18 (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06669.pdf (stating that EPA has been chronically late in issuing
regulations for emissions of hazardous air pollutants and noting that, because the agency fell behind in
issuing maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standards, it is also now behind in issuing
residual risk standards for these source categories); Steven D. Cook, Senators, Witnesses Say EPA Slow
to Issue Rules, Guidance for Meeting Air Standards, BNA DAILY ENV'T. REP., Nov. 14, 2005, at A-I
(reporting on testimony before a Senate subcommittee that EPA's "slow pace in issuing rules and
guidance has hindered its progress in achieving attainment of air quality standards for ozone and fine
particulates").
119. See, e.g., O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 17, at 11,071 (describing the
delay in mercury emissions reductions authorized by EPA's Clean Air Mercury Rule, under which the
[Vol. 31:273
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targets for ensuring compliance; 20 it has underfunded cleanup and other
risk reduction efforts;12' it has instructed staff and advisory groups to focus
on avoidance strategies-even in the face of input to the contrary;122 and it
has generally interpreted narrowly its authority to require risk reduction,
while at the same time interpreting broadly its ability to provide "regulatory
flexibility," to enlist only "voluntary" efforts by sources, and otherwise to
relieve sources of their obligations to reduce risk. 1
23
Whatever the reason, little discussion has surrounded the shift from
risk reduction to risk avoidance. This dearth of critical attention is itself
problematic, inasmuch as this shift implicates basic questions of value and
justice in environmental policy and appears to be taking place in the relative
absence of public debate. Indeed, the lack of considered public deliberation
has led one commentator to describe one category of such approaches as a
"sleeping giant.' 24
Nonetheless, several justifications might be gleaned from proponents'
calls for increased recourse to risk avoidance in lieu of risk reduction.
While risk avoidance strategies may hold promise in some respects, they
also introduce several perils. After exploring the promise and perils of risk
avoidance in turn, this Part offers some observations about how the
competing claims fare on balance. Ultimately, I conclude that the perils are
many and serious, rendering risk avoidance inappropriate in most instances.
second-phase cap will not be imposed until 2018, and actual reductions are not expected until even
later); David D. Kirkpatrick, He's Battered, But His Agenda Isn 't Beaten, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, § 4
(Week in Review), at I (describing EPA's proposed standard, issued in December 2005, for industrial
and vehicular soot, which grants a generous fifteen years for compliance in the most polluted counties).
120. See, e.g., Patricia Ware, Drinking Water: EPA Proposes 'More Realistic' Target for
Compliance with Federal Standards, BNA DAILY ENv'T. REP., Sept. 1I, 2006, at A-1I (recounting
EPA's proposal to lower its goal for the percentage of U.S. residents served by community water
systems that are in compliance with all federal standards from 95% by 2008 to 91% by 2011).
121. See, e.g., Martina E. Cartwright, Superfund: It's No Longer Super and It Isn't Much of a
Fund, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 317-18 (2005) (evaluating CERCLA from its adoption to the present
and criticizing the failure to reauthorize the Act's taxing authority).
122. See O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13, at II (relaying
attempts by some EPA staff to redirect and cabin debate during the advisory committee process that
culminated in the NEJAC Fish Consumption Report, so that it focused exclusively on refining fish
consumption advisories).
123. See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, EPA at 30: Fairness in Environmental Protection, 31 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,528, 10,533, 10,557-61 (May 2001) (observing that EPA has recently allowed
greater permitting flexibility and at the same time refrained from vigorous enforcement); Heinzerling &
Steinzor, Perfect Storm I, supra note 21; Lisa Heinzerling et al., Ctr. For Progressive Reform, Mercury
(2005), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/perspectives/mercury.cfn.
124. Amy L. Edwards, The Sleeping Giant Awakes: The Growing Public Debate About
Institutional Controls, A.B.A. ENVTL. TRANSACTIONS, AUDITS & BROWNFIELDS CoMM. NEWSL (Jan.
2001).
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A. The Promise of Risk Avoidance
Risk avoidance is potentially promising and might be justified along a
number of lines. Risk avoidance offers cost savings. Risk avoidance
enhances autonomy or individual choice regarding risks. Risk avoidance
increases individual responsibility for addressing risks. Risk avoidance
discourages outlier or non-"normal" practices. This section elaborates each
of these justifications.
1. Risk Avoidance Offers Cost Savings
Cost savings are the chief virtue of a move to risk avoidance. By
limiting human exposure, "the same amount of human health protection"
can be obtained without incurring the considerable costs of preventing,
eliminating, or treating contamination. Risk avoidance can thus help to
enhance the economic efficiency of environmental risk regulation,
achieving the same benefits at a lower cost.
The argument for efficiency has been most clearly articulated in the
context of use-restricted cleanups, where, proponents argue, risk avoidance
might be employed to garner the same amount of human health protection
at a "radically reduce[d]" cost.125 At present, there exist no comprehensive
data quantifying the cost savings from the use of institutional controls.
126
However, commentators have opined that the savings are "substantial"'
' 27
and "can run into millions of dollars.' 128 Anecdotal accounts appear to bear
this out, at least with respect to initial cost savings. At a former chromium
125. Philip E. Karmel, Achieving Radical Reductions in Cleanup Costs, 499 PRAC. LAW
INST./REAL 371, 382-83 (Nov. 2003); see generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE
11-19 (1993) (providing examples of how removal of all toxic contamination from a site "can involve
limited technological choice, high cost, devotion of considerable agency resources, large legal fees, and
endless argument"); Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, The Superfund Debate, in ANALYZING
SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAw 3, 14-16 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds.,
1995) (observing that use restrictions are less costly than permanent cleanups, but allowing that
nonpermanent restrictions ignore future enforcement costs, environmental justice concerns, and some
health costs); David F. Coursen, Institutional Controls at Superfund Sites, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,279 (May 1993) (discussing the limitations of institutional controls).
126. E-mail from Michael Bellot, Director, Institutional Controls Program, Environmental
Protection Agency, to author (Aug. 31, 2005) (explaining that no study quantifying the cost savings of
institutional controls exists and that EPA has been working on compiling these data since 2001, a task
complicated by a number of factors).
127. Geisinger, supra note 47, at 369 (citing "substantial" cost savings associated with use-
restricted cleanups). Note that Geisinger at the same time challenges the assumption that such use-
restricted cleanups actually result in the "same amount" of health protection. Id. See infra notes 198
and accompanying text.
128. Richard G. Opper, The BrownfieldManifesto, 37 URB. LAW. 163, 184 (2005).
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processing site in Jersey City, New Jersey, cleanup costs could be reduced
by $100 million-from $400 million to $300 million-if hexavalent
chromium wastes were permitted to be left on-site and capped rather than
removed to a licensed disposal site.129 At a toxic waste dump in southern
New Hampshire, cleanup costs could be reduced by $9.3 million if a certain
amount of PCBs, benzene, and other volatile organic compounds were
allowed to remain on-site rather than removed and incinerated.
30
Although less clearly articulated in other contexts, cost savings are
likely to be the primary impetus for a move to risk avoidance here as well.
In commenting on the CAMR, for example, the National Mining
Association called for reliance on risk avoidance in the form of fish
consumption advisories, citing advisories' cost effectiveness relative to
decreasing mercury emissions from coal-fired utilities.' 3' Similarly, Ted
Gayer and Robert Hahn make an implicit case for risk avoidance in this
context when they argue that the government should not have regulated
mercury emissions from coal-fired utilities at all, given their calculation that
the benefits of doing so would be outstripped by the costs. 32  More
generally, Tarlock's call to consider a shift to risk avoidance highlights
"efficiency" as one of two axes along which such a move might prove
advantageous. 33 As in the case of institutional controls, data quantifying
the cost savings from a shift to risk avoidance in these other contexts are
incomplete. 134 However, given the substantial literature suggesting that risk
129. Anthony DePalma, Finding the Bottom ofa Polluted Field, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at
27. This estimate of the cost savings is attributed to Katherine L. Adams, vice president and general
counsel at Honeywell Corporation, the corporate successor to Allied Signal and Mutual Chemical
Company (which operated one of the world's largest chromium processing plants) and the party
responsible for financing cleanup at the site. Id
130. BREYER, supra note 125, at 11-12. But cf. Adam N. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an
Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 295, 313-15 (1995) (arguing that the Ottati & Goss case from which Breyer takes this example is
actually an exceptional, rather than typical, case and questioning Breyer's factual claim that the site
would be "mostly cleaned up" in the absence of additional cleanup efforts and, consequently,
expenditures).
131. NAT'L MINING ASS'N, supra note 113, at 8.
132. Ted Gayer & Robert Hahn, The Political Economy of Mercury Regulation, REGULATION,
Summer 2005, at 26, 32. Gayer and Hahn make the case for risk avoidance in lieu of risk reduction if
one assumes that the course of action they propose means that the risks of human exposure to mercury
(which, they suggest, are overstated) would be addressed by means of the status quo roster of fish
consumption advisories, as was assured by EPA. It is, of course, possible that Gayer and Hahn would
also find this risk avoidance measure unsupportable by their cost-benefit criterion.
133. Tarlock, supra note 98, at 10,277.
134. See, e.g., Paul Jakus et al., The Benefits and Costs of Fish Consumption Advisories for
Mercury (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 02-55 2002), available at
http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-02-55.pdf (stating that uncertainty limits confidence in
estimated cost savings from mortality reduction related to mercury consumption advisories).
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regulation currently entails large costs, 135 it is likely that there are indeed
opportunities for cost savings in numerous contexts. Although the promise
of reduced costs stands as the primary rationale for a move to risk
avoidance, other reasons might support this move as well.
2. Risk Avoidance Enhances Autonomy
Risk avoidance strategies entail greater autonomy or individual choice.
Individuals have different preferences regarding risk. They differ in their
general willingness to bear risk, and they differ in their perception of-and
tolerance for-particular risks. In order to respect individuals' autonomy,
risk regulation needs to account for these differences. Because risk
avoidance strategies leave it to the individual to decide whether to alter the
practices that expose her to environmental contaminants, they accommodate
choice and so demonstrate respect for these differences. No one is
compelled to support more risk reduction than she would choose.
W. Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer, for example, make an autonomy-based
claim in the context of health and safety warnings:
Unlike technology-forcing regulations that constrain individual
choice, hazard warnings potentially can work through the market
by providing consumers and workers with needed information.
... [C]hoices by consumers and workers subject to the receipt of
the information would be respected so that market forces would
permit people to make choices consistent with their own risk-cost
balancing rather than being subject to uniform regulatory
standards that almost invariably fail to recognize such differences
in individuals' willingness to bear risk.
136
In the context of cleanups at hazardous waste sites, some proponents
have invoked autonomy arguments on behalf of those who will live with the
1
135. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 125, at 12-13; W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Safety at Any
Price?, REGULATION, Fall 2002, at 54, 55-56 (arguing that an "unbounded commitment to safety" has
been very costly). But cf FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 41-60 (The New Press 2004) (discussing how the
purported costs of regulation are often grossly inflated).
136. Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 135, at 60. But cf Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning
Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California 's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303,317 n.72 (1996)
(stating that individuals exposed to contaminants in the environment, rather than as consumers or
workers, "have no traditional 'market' in which they can express their preferences" and observing that
residents might "theoretically sell their homes and leave the area, but this is not a realistic option for
most people, and in any case, does not exert any economic pressure on the entity responsible for the
exposures").
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higher levels of risk that remain when risk reduction is not pursued. Citing
the fact that "[r]isk is inherently subjective," Richard Opper posits that
many of those in communities desperate for the jobs or amenities associated
with redevelopment might find "acceptable" risk at levels greater than the
"one-in-a-million" figure that is the standard for carcinogens. 3 7  Cleanup
here might be pursued to a less protective level, he argues, and the projects
"can incorporate signage to indicate the increased risk so that those who are
concerned can avoid the site.' 38
Autonomy arguments often appear alongside welfare-based arguments
for individuated risk. Although Cass Sunstein does not make the case for
risk avoidance as such, his arguments in the more general context of risk
regulation might be enlisted in the service of increased use of risk
avoidance. Sunstein observes that individuals vary greatly in their desire to
have different risks reduced and argues that "[i]f different people have
different tastes and tolerances for risk, government should recognize that
fact.' 39 This is so, he argues, for two reasons. First, from the standpoint of
welfare, government ought to respect individuals' different perceptions of
risk because people's choices regarding risk reduction, as expressed through
their willingness to pay (WTP), are a good guide to their own welfare.
Second, from the standpoint of individual autonomy, government ought to
respect individuals' different tolerances for risk because people ought to be
treated with respect, which includes permitting them to use their resources
as they see fit.
140
3. Risk Avoidance Increases Individual Responsibility
Risk avoidance strategies increase individuals' responsibility for
addressing the risks they face.' 4' Risk can be viewed as a result of the
coincidence in time and space of two incompatible elements: environmental
contaminants and human (and ecological) receptors that might be harmed
137. See, e.g., Opper, supra note 128, at 184-87. Opper, an attorney representing developers,
makes it clear who it is that he assumes comprises the communities faced with such "choices": these are
"underserved and underprivileged minority neighborhood[s] of color." Id. at 186. See discussion infra
Part I.C.3.
138. Id. at 185.
139. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 152 (2005)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR].
140. Id.
141. Arguments for "individual responsibility" in this context should be distinguished from
arguments made in instances where individuals are the source of environmental pollutants. See, e.g.,
Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era
of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 518 (2004).
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by contact with those contaminants. 142 As such, any measures that mitigate
this coincidence-whether required of "risk-producers" or "risk-bearers"--
might properly be considered among the menu of options for risk
regulation. Strategies that require risk-bearers to act, then, reflect a choice
among the possible ways to allocate responsibility for addressing risk, one
that locates responsibility with those whose practices or lifeways expose
them to environmental contaminants.
Tarlock, for example, holds out hope that the increasing availability of
information regarding individuals' susceptibility will enable agencies to
tailor regulation and require those exposed to take individual avoidance
steps:
Our current regulatory strategy for toxic pollutants is second-
best. Ideally, regulation would be based on deterministic causal
relationships between exposure and illness or genetic mutation,
but this level of certainty is not [currently] possible .... At the
present time, we lack the information to "force" greater
individual responsibility for most harms that result from general
environmental exposure. ... We are presumed to be "victims"
of environmental pollution with little or limited capacity to
mitigate the harm of exposure. For example, asthmatics and
other at-risk populations are not expected to move from ozone
nonattainment areas designated by the Clean Air Act. At most,
they are expected to refrain from strenuous activities on ozone
alert days.
EPA recently sounded the theme of individual responsibility when it
marked "World Asthma Day" with a press release entitled "More Than 70
Percent Could Better Manage Asthma Triggers, EPA Survey Finds."'
44
EPA focuses exclusively on actions individuals could be taking to avoid
exposure to "asthma triggers," such as "secondhand smoke, cockroaches,
dust mites, mold, and ozone. ,1 45 EPA celebrates its efforts to raise public
awareness among the millions of Americans with asthma and to encourage
them to take steps to avoid exposure. EPA highlights a host of initiatives;
142. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (criticizing
arguments for internalizing negative externalities from industrial pollution and arguing that social costs
are reciprocal).
143. Tarlock, supra note 98, at 10,278-80.
144. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, More Than 70 Percent Could Better Manage
Asthma Triggers, EPA Survey Finds (May 3, 2005), available at
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from health care providers' educational efforts to an EPA partnership with
the Ad Council to produce public service announcements "describing
simple steps parents can take to reduce asthma triggers commonly found in
homes, daycares, and schools.0 46 However, EPA nowhere mentions any
possibility for reducing the pollutants that lead to ground-level ozone
formation from industrial and other sources.1
47
Note that a particularly invidious version of the call for individual
responsibility occurs in the form of proponents' efforts to blame the risk-
bearers for being exposed. 148 One commentator, for example, suggests that
"[t]he explanation for high asthma rates in the inner city is as obvious as it
is unpleasant: a combination of poor housekeeping practices with run-
down, cockroach-infested housing."'149 The solution, this commentator
argues, is to look past the sources of air pollution and instead "to
recommend that parents be more diligent with their Hoovers."' 50  In a
similar vein, the National Mining Association invokes the language of
criminology to argue for more lenient standards for mercury emissions from
coal-fired utilities, casting the risk-bearers as "women of child-bearing age
with a propensity to consume seafood containing high levels of
methylmercury."151
4. Risk Avoidance Discourages Outlier Practices
Risk avoidance can discount or discourage practices that are deemed
unnecessary or outside the norm. When a practice or pursuit leaves
individuals exposed to environmental contaminants, risk avoidance asks
them to change their ways. To the extent that it is desirable to reduce the
prevalence of certain frivolous or outlier practices, risk avoidance can
facilitate this effort.
Some proponents of risk avoidance have suggested that discouraging
unnecessary practices is a salutary effect of risk avoidance. An oil industry
executive took this tack in arguing for less protective ozone standards: "On
bad air days, people can protect themselves. They can avoid jogging.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, supra note 1!1, at 41-55 (documenting, in a
chapter entitled "Shifting the Blame," the point that "[iln recent years, industry and government political
appointees have labored to shift responsibility for addressing the consequences of pollution from the
polluters to their victims").
149. Steven J. Milloy, Editorial, A Second Look at the Asthma Epidemic, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 16,
1998, available at http://www.junkscience.com/news2/asthma.htm.
150. Id.
151. NAT'L MINING ASS'N, supra note 113, at 8 (emphasis added).
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Asthmatic kids need not go out and ride their bicycles.' ' 5 2 Again, in the
debate about mercury contamination, the Utility Air Regulatory Group
suggested that eating fish--or at the very least fish from the vast expanses
of waters currently covered by mercury advisories-is not necessary:
"[T]he primary purpose for fish advisories is to warn the public about
undue consumption of fish from given water bodies."' 53
This argument for risk avoidance is often not made explicit. At times,
it is displayed in the form of ignorance of or incredulity regarding non-
majority practices. For example, a stakeholder made the rhetorical case for
less protective assumptions regarding fish consumption in Washington's
state cleanup provisions by asking, "Who in the world would expect their
fish diet to come from the same contaminated source[?]"'4--despite the
longstanding presence of numerous tribes in the area whose members fish
from the same spots and consume large quantities of the fish they catch
(indeed, who have treaty-guaranteed rights to do so). 155 Note, however, that
this perspective is more likely to be made transparent where the practices
and lifeways at issue are those of tribes or other non-dominant groups.' 
56
B. The Perils of Risk Avoidance
Risk avoidance is also perilous for several reasons. First, risk
avoidance narrows the focus of environmental regulatory efforts, foregoing
a web of ancillary benefits to human and ecological health. Second, risk
avoidance often misses the complete roster of target human health effects.
Third, risk avoidance is ineffective, frequently failing to achieve the
behavioral changes necessary for avoidance. Additionally, risk avoidance
offers diminishing and, ultimately, finite options for managing
environmental risks. Risk avoidance also often introduces risks. Risk
152. Edward F. Snyder, Editorial, Clinton's Decision Good One for Maine and All Its Children
by Standing up to EPA 's Critics, He Will Help Asthmatics and Others Breathe Better, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, June 28, 1997, at 9A.
153. COUNSEL FOR UTILITY Am REGULATORY GROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET
ID No. OAR-2002-0056, COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED NATIONAL EMISSIONS STANDARD FOR
HAZARDOUS Am POLLUTANTS 27-28 (2004) (emphasis added). The "UARG is a voluntary, nonprofit
association of electric generating companies and organizations and four national trade associations (the
Edison Electric Institute, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the American Public
Power Association, and the National Mining Association)." Id. at I n. 1.
154. WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY FOR THE AMENDMENTS TO
THE MODEL ToXICS CONTROL ACT CLEANUP REGULATION: CHAPTER 173-340 WAC, at 217 (1991)
(emphasis added), available at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/tcp/regs/1991%20Responsiveness%20Summary.pdf.
155. Id.
156. This claim is elaborated at length in O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples,
supra note 13.
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avoidance discourages plural and diverse practices. Finally, risk avoidance
is often unjust. This section explores each of these perils.
1. Risk Avoidance is Myopic
Risk avoidance is myopic: it narrows the focus of environmental
regulation. Risk avoidance targets only human health effects and considers
only specific, direct threats to human health. Risk avoidance measures seek
to break the chain connecting contamination with adverse human health
effects by focusing on a link late in the chain-the point of human
exposure. These measures therefore leave unaddressed the myriad other
effects of contamination.
Risk avoidance declines entirely to address adverse effects on any non-
human components of ecosystems. Signs erected along the South Fork of
the Coeur d'Alene River warning of lead-contaminated sediments do not
reach the mergansers and other waterfowl that live on the river.
157
Pamphlets posted on the EPA website or distributed through grocery stores
suggesting that foods treated with pesticides be washed, peeled, or
trimmed' 58 do not reach the salmon that swim in contaminated
watercourses. These salmon not only suffer adverse effects themselves, but
also transport pesticides in their tissue as they migrate, thereby affecting
predators such as bald eagles, bears, and grayling in far-flung
ecosystems.' 59 This exclusion of non-human environmental health is at
odds with the understanding that human health is but one element of
environmental law and policy efforts-an understanding that is enshrined in
a number of environmental statutes that form the core of environmental law,
such as the Endangered Species Act, which ensures the conservation of
endangered species and the ecosystems on which they depend,' 60 and
section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which protects human and environmental
health from the adverse effects of hazardous air pollutants.' 6' This lack of
concern for non-human health, moreover, is troubling to those who
157. See, e.g., Julia Silverman, Death ofFish-Eating Birds Alarms Biologists-Lead Poisoning
Moves up the Food Chain, SPOKESMAN REv. (Spokane, WA), Aug. 11, 2001, at Al ("[Tihere's no way
to put up signs warning mergansers and other wildlife not to eat fish because of possible [lead]
contamination.").
158. OFFICE OF PESTICIDES PROGRAM, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES AND FOOD:
WHAT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY NEED TO KNOW 3, available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/food
[hereinafter EPA, PESTICIDES AND FOOD].
159. See, e.g., Goran Ewald et al., Biotransport of Organic Pollutants to an Inland Alaska Lake
by Migrating Sockeye Salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka), 51 ARCTIC 40, 45 (1998) (finding that pollutants
in salmon are directly transferred to predators through the process of bioaccumulation).
160. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
161. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(0 (2000).
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understand not only ecological health but also human, cultural, and spiritual
well-being to be at stake. Such a myopic focus is troubling, for example,
for the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, for whom loons, mink, and other
animals affected by methylmercury contamination are valued as parts of an
integrated ecosystem and are considered culturally important, serving as
clan symbols.
162
Even if one's concern is chiefly with human health, however, risk
avoidance may ultimately fail to address many direct and indirect effects on
humans. Thus, whereas a risk avoidance measure may target a particular
contaminant's direct effects on human health, e.g., its toxicity to humans,
the measure may neglect its indirect effects, e.g., its capacity to deplete
resources on which humans depend. For example, the current regulatory
scheme for pesticides relies in part on risk avoidance measures that target
two categories of human exposure: consumers' exposure to "pesticide
residue[s] in or on food"'163 and farmworkers' occupational exposure to
pesticides.' 64 As to the first category, EPA has published a brief pamphlet
that suggests means for consumers to avoid residues on foods that have
been treated with pesticides (e.g., washing, peeling, or trimming fruits and
vegetables). The pamphlet also indicates that consumers have a right to
know when EPA has permitted a pesticide to be used despite a finding of
unacceptable health risks to consumers-in which case EPA will help direct
consumers to alternative foods that are "equally nutritious.' ' 65 As to the
second category, EPA has issued a Worker Protection Standard that
requires farmworkers to observe a certain waiting period or "restricted-
entry interval" before reentering fields that have been sprayed with
pesticides. 66 Yet these pesticides or their breakdown products eventually
enter the watercourses that support fish and other aquatic life.167 There is
evidence that numerous pesticides impair several crucial physiological
functions in both Pacific and Atlantic salmon, ultimately contributing to
diminished reproduction and decreased populations of these species.
68
162. MINN. CHIPPEWA TRIBE, DOCKET No. OAR-2002-0056, COMMENTS ON EPA'S MERCURY
REDUCTION RULE 1-2 (2004). "Mercury is known to seriously impact fish eating wildlife such as loons
and mink. These animals are a value to the ecosystem they inhabit and they are clan symbols for Tribal
members. If these animals are threatened, Tribal culture is threatened." Id
163. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(1) (2000).
164. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136w(a)(l) (2000).
165. EPA, PESTICIDES AND FOOD, supra note 158.
166. 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(a)(l) (2005).
167. See, e.g., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PESTICIDES IN THE NATION'S STREAMS AND GROUND
WATER, 1992-2001, at 7 (2006), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/circJcircl291 (finding
pesticides present in groundwater wells, streams, and rivers at levels that could pose a threat to aquatic
life and to fish-eating wildlife).
168. See, e.g., Jason F. Sandahl et al., Odor-evoked Field Potentials as Indicators of Sublethal
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Human health is thus indirectly impacted to the extent that humans rely on
salmon for food and, in some cases, for economic, cultural, and spiritual
well-being.
169
Or, whereas risk avoidance may take aim at the current human health
effects of contamination left in place, it may fail to consider the human
health effects should the contaminants migrate or otherwise behave
unpredictably in the environment. For example, recent reviews of the
Superfund cleanup at the Bunker Hill Mining and Metallurgical Site in the
Coeur d'Alene River Basin have identified several instances in which lead
has migrated to recontaminate areas that have already been cleaned up.
170
Soils contaminated with lead are eroding from surrounding hillsides, are
being tracked by vehicles from unpaved surfaces, or are otherwise
migrating into relatively clean areas, including residential yards that have
already been remediated. 171 Additionally, contaminated sediments in the
riverbeds may be carried downstream with the currents or upland with the
basin's frequent floodwaters, contaminating or recontaminating sediments
and soils with lead and other heavy metals. 172 As EPA and the National
Neurotoxicity in Juvenile Coho Salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) Exposed to Copper, Chlorpyrifos, or
Esfenvalerate, 61 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCIENCES 404, 412 (2004) (explaining how sublethal
effects of pesticides on salmonids include the loss of olfactory function, which interferes with survival,
migration, and reproduction); B. D. Johnston et al., Biochemical Effects of Didecyldimethylammonium
Chloride (DDAC) Exposure and Osmoregulatory Stress on Juvenile Coho Salmon, Oncorhynchus
kisutch, 34 ARCHIVES ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 275 (1998); Andrew Moore & Nicola
Lower, The Impact of Two Pesticides on Olfactory-mediated Endocrine Function in Mature Male
Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar L) Smolts, 222 AQUACULTURE 253 (2001); Andrew Moore & Colin P.
Waring, The Effects of a Synthetic Pyrethroid Pesticide on Some Aspects of Reproduction in Atlantic
Salmon (Salmo salar L), 52 AQUATIC TOXICOLOGY 1, 8-10 (2001) (discussing the deleterious effects of
pyrethroid pesticides on Atlantic salmon reproduction).
169. See, e.g., NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 93-94 (citing Swinomish
Indian Tribal Community, Comments on the Draft NEJAC Fish Consumption Report (Feb. 5, 2002)).
In the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, fish and shellfish represent vital
subsistence and commercial resources for the Tribe as well as an important point
of cultural association for the Tribe's identity. Employed in cultural and religious
ceremonies, incorporated in the common diet, and sold to support families on the
Reservation, the current ecological status and fate of these species is of utmost
interest to the Tribe.
Id.
170. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SECOND FIVE-YEAR REVIEW FOR THE BUNKER HILL MINING
AND METALLURGICAL COMPLEX SUPERFUND SITE (2005) [hereinafter EPA, BUNKER HILL SECOND
FIVE-YEAR REVIEW]; NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, SUPERFUND AND MINING MEGASITES, supra note 66, at 70,
212, 346.
171. EPA, BUNKER HILL SECOND FIVE-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 170.
172. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, SUPERFUND AND MINING MEGASITES, supra note 66, at 400. Note
that this finding led the National Academy of Sciences to recommend that EPA remove the largest
sources of contaminated sediments from the affected rivers, particularly those in locations most likely to
be carried downstream and to criticize the EPA for failing to account for the basin's frequent floods
which, among other things, could lead to recontamination of soils and sediments that had previously
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Academy of Sciences have recognized, this migration undermines the
assumptions on which current remediation efforts and institutional controls
are based. 173 In a similar vein, lead, arsenic, and PAHs left untreated in the
"undeveloped" portion of the Agriculture Street Landfill Site in New
Orleans remain a potential threat to human health. As noted above, the
ATSDR and others have found evidence that humans continued to access
the area, despite the presence of a fence. People use the area for storage of
Mardi Gras floats and other vehicles-vehicles that potentially track
contaminants into clean areas of the site. 74 In addition, when Hurricane
Katrina hit New Orleans, the entire site was inundated and remained under
water for days. 175 Although data are still being gathered, there is evidence
that lead, arsenic, and other contaminants were carried by floodwaters and
may now contaminate the soils at the site and across much of New
Orleans.
176
Given the vast gaps in our current understanding of relationships
among the various components (including human components) of
ecosystems, it is quite plausible that contamination left unabated will
ultimately contribute to indirect or direct human health effects in the present
and future generations.
2. Risk Avoidance May Be Off Target
Risk avoidance efforts may be underinclusive or off target. Because
risk avoidance focuses on the point of human exposure, it depends on a
complete understanding of the human health endpoints involved and the
pathways and circumstances of human exposure. Where such
understandings are less than complete, warnings will miss their mark and
institutional controls will be misconceived. For example, current risk
been cleaned up. Id. at 400-01.
173. Id.
174. See discussion supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
175. See Eilperin, supra note 64 (observing that "much of [the water] trapped inside New
Orleans had infiltrated the waste [site] and absorbed a range of contaminants"). See generally
Knickerbocker & Jonsson, supra note 64 (discussing how "toxicants such as petroleum products, paints,
and acids" will continue to cause problems after floodwaters recede).
176. AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES DISEASE REGISTRY, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
HEALTH CONSULTATION: HURRICANE RESPONSE SAMPLING ASSESSMENT FOR THE AGRICULTURAL
STREET LANDFILL SITE 7 (2006), available at http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/miscdocsdocs-
205/PHA/AgricultureStLandfill-NewOrleansHCO82906_l.pdf (finding that that majority of
contaminants detected in flood-deposited sediments and soils at the site posed "no apparent public health
hazard," but that PAHs in concentrations of concern were present at the north end of the site and so
posed an "indeterminate public health hazard" at the site); Spencer S. Hsu & Juliet Eilperin, Safety of
Post-Hurricane Sludge Is Disputed, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006, at A3.
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avoidance measures for methylmercury focus on its neurodevelopmental
effects. Thus, fish consumption advisories are aimed primarily at women of
childbearing age and children. 177 Yet the most recent studies reveal that
methylmercury also adversely affects the cardiovascular system in adult
males. 78 This health endpoint and subpopulation at risk are largely missed
by advisories. Or, for example, consumption advisories for methylmercury
may only address fish, but humans may also consume other species
contaminated with methylmercury, such as wild duck, for which no
advisories have been issued. '7 Consumption advisories may also fail to
mention particular parts, preparation methods, or uses of contaminated
species-such as the bones, or internal organs of fish used by Russian
immigrant communities along the Spokane River to make soup, 80 or the
clams used by Suquamish tribal members to alleviate their children's
teething pain181'-perhaps because health and environmental agencies are
unaware of such practices.'
8 2
Ultimately, the exposure scenarios around which risk avoidance
measures are crafted may prove off base because future land or resource
uses are not accurately foreseen. For example, at the Agriculture Street
Landfill site, the five-year review indicated that measures, such as
instructions to property owners, designed to ensure the integrity of the
engineering controls in the residential area failed adequately to anticipate
and address property owners' routine maintenance activities, including tree
177. See, e.g., EPA, MERCURY ADVISORY FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, supra note 16.
178. See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 18; Eliseo Guallar et al., Mercury, Fish
Oils, and the Risk of Myocardial Infarction, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1747, 1752 (2002). But cf Kazuko
Yoshizawa et al., Mercury and the Risk of Coronary Heart Disease in Men, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1755, 1759 (2002) (finding a "positive but not significant association between mercury levels and the
risk of coronary heart disease").
179. See, e.g., FOND DU LAC BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA, DOCKET NO. OAR-2002-
0056, COMMENTS ON THE NOTICE OF DATA AVAILABILITY FOR THE CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE 3
(2004) (noting that tribal members are exposed to methylmercury not only through fish consumption but
also through other food sources, including waterfowl, and stating that tests conducted by the tribe
revealed some species of wild duck to be contaminated at levels similar to those found in fish tissue).
Note that in 2005, Utah became the first state to issue a waterfowl consumption advisory due to mercury
contamination. It advised against any consumption of two species of wild duck, the Common
Goldeneye and Northern Shoveler, harvested from Great Salt Lake marshes. UTAH DEP'T OF HEALTH,
UTAH WATERFOWL ADVISORY 1 (2005), available at
http://health.utah.gov/epi/enviroepi/waterfowlhompage.doc.
180. Karen Dom Steele, Agencies Warn of Lead in River's Fish; Advisory Targets Consumption
of Contaminated Fish Caught in Stretch of Spokane River, SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane, WA), June 2 1,
2000, at Al. "Russians and other immigrants said they use the whole fish, including bones and internal
organs, in fish stews. The lead concentrates in bone and brains, the fish study showed." Id.
181. NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 35 (noting that "[c]hildren still
teethe on dried clams").
182. See generally id. at 34-40.
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planting. Whereas the instructions addressed handling and cultivating soils
above the geotextile barrier (on top of which two feet of clean fill had been
placed), they did not address handling and disposing of any soils excavated
beneath the barrier. 83  At numerous other sites, future land uses once
thought highly unlikely may come to pass, as former industrial sites become
desirable urban residential properties and former mining or agricultural
wastelands become attractive rural retreats.184
3. Risk Avoidance Is Often Ineffective
Risk avoidance is often ineffective. In order for risk avoidance to
work, advisories must be received and understood, restrictions must be
monitored and enforced, and, ultimately, human behaviors must be
changed. Even proponents of risk avoidance concede the considerable
hurdles in each of these respects.
There is ample evidence that advisories and warnings often do not
reach their intended audience. For example, a recent study showed that half
of those consuming fish caught on the Great Lakes were unaware of the
relevant fish consumption advisories. 85 Similarly, another study found that
only 45% of those fishing the Newark Bay Complex were aware of the
relevant fish and crab consumption advisories. 86 Notably, people of color,
people with limited English proficiency, people with limited formal
education, and low-income people tend to evidence the least awareness.
187
183. REGION 6, EPA, ASL, supra note 56, at 2-3.
184. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, supra note 129. "If ever there was unloved land, this is it, and
for years the city was willing just to let it lie there. But Jersey City's recent revival as a less expensive
alternative to Manhattan has brought town house developments practically up to the edge of the
chromium field." Id; Becky Kramer, Silver Valley Yielding New Commodity: Homes; Historic Mining
Area's First Subdivision in Three Decades Piques Buyers' Interest, SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane,
Wash.), Apr. 30, 2005, at Al (describing the increasing demand for real estate in the area surrounding
the Bunker Hill Mining and Metallurgical Site after decades of inactivity, as a result of population
growth and the demand for resort properties and second homes). But compare BREYER, supra note 125,
at 12 (arguing that further risk reduction was unwarranted at a New Hampshire site, because children
were not likely ever to come in contact with the contaminated soils there, for "future building seemed
unlikely" given that the area was "a swamp") with Finkel, supra note 130, at 314-15 (noting that
"although Breyer concludes ... that all such [risk] calculations were fanciful because the site was a
swamp, it was in fact zoned for residential development" and a marsh occupied only a portion of the
site).
185. John Tilden et al., Health Advisories for Consumers of Great Lakes Sport-Fish: Is the
Message Being Received?, 105 ENVrL. HEALTH PERSP. 1360, 1363 (1997).
186. Joanna Burger, Fish Consumption Advisories: Knowledge, Compliance and Why People
Fish in an Urban Estuary, 7 J. RISK RESEARCH 463, 469 (2004) (reporting results from a study of
Newark Bay in which less than half of the respondents had heard about fish consumption advisories).
187. See id at 469, 475 (finding that people of color, women, and those without a high school
diploma evidenced the least awareness of fish consumption advisories); Dyan M. Steenport et al., Fish
[Vol. 31:273
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Sometimes those who are most at risk are the least aware of advisories. 88
Even where those exposed are aware of the relevant advisories, it is often
the case that they do not recall accurately or do not understand the content
of the advisories. 89 For example, a recent survey in Oklahoma regarding
ozone alerts found that whereas 73% of those surveyed could recall having
heard about a "Clean Air Alert Day" the previous summer, only 50% of
those surveyed knew what a "Clean Air Alert Day" indicated. 90
There is also evidence that restrictions on the use of contaminated sites
and resources are often not implemented, monitored, or enforced. A recent
study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of Superfund sites
at which institutional controls were employed provides several examples.'9'
At one site, an institutional control prohibited any use of groundwater
without prior written approval from EPA. However, in 2003, EPA
discovered that over 25 million gallons of this water had been pumped for
use as drinking water during 2002 and that this use may have been going on
for some time during the previous five years as well. 92 At another site, an
institutional control required monitoring for worker safety precautions
Consumption Habits and Advisory Awareness Among Fox River Anglers, WIS. MED. J. 43,44-45, Nov.
2000, available at http://www.wisconsinmedicalsociety.org/uploads/wmj/steenport.pdf (finding that
95% of anglers on the Fox River in Wisconsin who ate fish were unaware of Wisconsin's fish advisory
pamphlet and 50% of anglers who ate fish had not "heard about nor read about the health risks" of Fox
River fish from any source. Of these, "Asians" (Hmong and Laotian individuals) represented 70% of
those who had not heard about the health risks, although they represented only 19% of the total anglers
surveyed). But cf Hugh F. MacDonald & Kevin J. Boyle, Effect of a Statewide Sport Fish Consumption
Advisory on Open-Water Fishing in Maine, 17 N. AM. J. OF FISHERIES MGMT. 687, 691 (1997) (finding
that 63% of all anglers were aware of the mercury advisory covering fish from all lakes in Maine and
finding no differences in awareness along the lines of gender, age, and "fishing effort," but differences
along the lines of education and income).
188. See, e.g., Tilden et al., supra note 185, at 1360, 1363 (finding that fish consumption
advisories do not effectively reach women, even though women are one of the target populations for
advisories due to mercury contamination); Steenport et al., supra note 187 (finding that "Asian" anglers
(primarily Hmong and Laotian anglers) were the least aware of the relevant advisories and that "White
Bass, listed in the advisory as 'Do Not Eat,' appears to be their [species] of choice").
189. See, e.g., AUDREY CHANG, ASIAN PAC. ENVTL. NETWORK, A SEAFOOD CONSUMPTION
SURVEY OF THE LAOTIAN COMMUNITY IN WEST CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 29 (1998)
(finding that 48.5% of respondents in the Laotian Community were aware of a consumption advisory for
fish and shellfish in San Francisco Bay, but that only 59.5% of those aware could recall what the
advisory said and none of those aware could recall the advisory's recommendations with any more
specificity than "pregnant women should not eat large amounts of Bay fish," or "Bay fish are not safe to
eat").
190. Ass'n of Cent. Okla. Gov'ts, Local Survey Shows Awareness of Ozone Alert Days, June 2,
2003, available at http://www.acogok.org/Newsroom/ViewNews.asp?article=47 (percentages are
rounded to the nearest whole percent).
191. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: IMPROVED
EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS AT SITES COULD BETTER PROTECT THE PUBLIC 17-35 (2005) (on file
with GAO), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05l63.pdf.
192. Id. at29.
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during any digging operations at the site. A GAO visit, however, revealed
active digging about which the supervising EPA official for the site was
unaware because he had not visited the site in four years. 93 At a third site,
the GAO found "significant evidence of trespassing at the site," but a
steadfast refusal on the part of the responsible official to monitor the site.'94
Other sources similarly relate accounts of broken fences and breached
prohibitions. 195 Advisories and warnings, too, may not be adequately
maintained. Agency officials in New Jersey found that a sign advising
against crabbing on the Hackensack River had fallen or been taken down
and was being used, ironically, by a family who had placed it over a fire to
support a cooking pot filled with river water and freshly caught crabs.
196
An agency review of the Agriculture Street Landfill site in New Orleans,
discussed above, revealed that there were no provisions for forwarding to
new property owners the instructions designed to ensure the integrity of
engineering controls in the residential portion of the site (e.g., for handling
and cultivating soils above the geotextile barrier).1 97  And zoning
restrictions or other proprietary controls may not be enforced.
98
Even if risk avoidance measures are completely effective in each of
these two respects-they reach and are understood by their intended
audiences and they are maintained in perpetuity-it is notoriously difficult
to effect behavioral changes in people.19 9 The perspective offered by one
recreational angler from Wisconsin is illustrative: despite being aware of
methylmercury contamination in the fish caught in local lakes, and despite
having been advised personally by his physician to eliminate fish from his
193. Id. at 30.
194. Id. at 31-32.
195. See, e.g., Elizabeth Shogren, Toxic-cleanup Money Running Dry, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 5,
2002, at A5 (describing the site of the abandoned Chemical Insecticide Corp., located adjacent to
suburban homes in Edison, New Jersey, which was contaminated with arsenic, lead, dioxin, and other
chemicals: "On a recent afternoon, the back gate ... was wide open. The only indication of the
potential danger inside was a sign face down in the dirt that read: 'Danger no trespassing; hazardous
substances present."'); see discussion supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text (describing ATSDR
findings that, despite the fence around the "undeveloped" area of Agriculture Street Landfill, individuals
continued to access the area, vehicles continued to be stored there, and the soil had been disturbed to a
depth of up to six inches).
196. Kerry Kirk Pflugh, Community Outreach to At-Risk Urban Anglers: A Case Study in Risk
Communication of Fish Consumption Advisories, NAT'L RISK COMMC'N CONFERENCE 11-32, 11-35
(2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/ost/fish/forum/riskconf.pdf.
197. REGION 6, EPA, ASL, supra note 56, at 2.
198. See, e.g., Geisinger, supra note 47, at 386-93 (discussing limitations of regulatory,
proprietary, and other institutional controls in proscribing future uses of contaminated lands).
199. See, e.g., Vincent T. Covello et al., Risk Communication: A Review of the Literature, 3
RISK ABSTRACTS 171, 174-75 (1986) (noting that behavioral changes are hampered, among other
things, by individuals' lack of motivation, reluctance to make the necessary tradeoffs, or fear and
anxiety).
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diet in order to reduce mercury levels in his blood, he concedes that he
"can't help himself' and so "now cheats a bit" and eats the fish he
catches.2 °0  Studies bear out this anecdotal account. According to one
recent survey, of the 48.5% of respondents who were aware of the relevant
fish consumption advisories for the San Francisco Bay, only 60.3%
reported reducing their fish intake as a result.20 1  Indeed, health and
environmental agencies have emphasized the difficulty of getting risk-
bearers to "comply" with fish consumption advisories by altering their
preparation and consumption practices.20 2 Similarly, people frequently do
not comply with ozone alerts. Even those with a heightened interest often
decline to change their ways. For example, only 56% of participants who
voluntarily signed up to receive personal electronic notices of ozone alerts
from the South Coast Air Quality Management District in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area altered their behavior in accordance with the alerts they
received.2 °3
These hurdles, moreover, loom larger and may become insurmountable
when those affected do not speak the language in which advisories are
dispensed, do not have the economic wherewithal to alter their practices, or
do not share the culture of the dominant population. Those who do not
speak English may be missed entirely by warning signs posted only in
English. 204 Those with modest economic means may have few options for
200. NOW: The Politics of Mercury (PBS television broadcast June 25, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/now/printable/transcript326_fullprint.html); see also Felicity
Barringer, New Hampshire Senate to Vote on Approach to Mercury Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at
AI4 (quoting a long-time fisher who indicated that he will continue to fish in local lakes and will "not
cut back on his fish consumption" of two to three fish meals per week, despite advisories warning of
mercury contamination in these waters).
201. See CHANG, supra note 189, at 29; accord Burger, supra note 186, at 475 (finding that,
even in the face of laws forbidding catching and consuming crabs from the Newark Bay Complex,
people continue to do so).
202. See, e.g., Pflugh, supra note 196, at 11-33 (discussing challenges for New Jersey's fish
consumption advisory program, given the "large number of people who were not complying with the
advisories" but "were still eating [fish], despite the issuing of advisories"); HENRY ANDERSON,
NATIONAL RISK COMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 11-36 (2001) (recounting efforts to evaluate the
effectiveness of Wisconsin's fish consumption advisories and finding "awareness" to be very high, but
"compliance" to be lacking).
203. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Board Meeting, Pager Alert Pilot Survey, att. 1 (Dec. 10,
1999), available at http://www.aqmd.gov/hb/l999/991210a.html.
204. See, e.g., NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 117-18 (discussing
Oregon's Bureau of Environmental Services' efforts in assisting the City of Portland in translating a fish
advisory brochure into six foreign languages). Note that even advisories issued in multiple languages
may nonetheless miss large numbers of anglers due to language barriers. See, e.g., LAOTIAN
ORGANIZING PROJECT, FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE 5 (2001) (indicating dismay at the fact that a state fish
consumption advisory posted in a popular fishing spot in Richmond, California was written only in
English, Spanish, and Vietnamese: "The Vietnamese language translation is useless to a predominantly
Laotian population.").
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risk avoidance: it may be wholly impractical to fish "elsewhere" if all of the
rivers, lakes, and bayous nearby are contaminated and one does not own a
car or have the money for gas;20 5 it may be unrealistic to stay inside on
"ozone alert" days if one's livelihood depends on working outdoors. And
those for whom fish consumption includes spiritual, traditional, or cultural
dimensions may be deeply resistant to altering their practices. Indeed, they
may feel that it is simply not possible to change their preparation methods,
to cease eating particular species, or to move from their customary fishing
places.206 This is likely the case, for example, for members of the various
Ojibwe tribes. A recent survey conducted by the Great Lakes Indian Fish
and Wildlife Commission showed that whereas 57% of tribal fishers were
aware of mercury advisories for walleye-an important species for tribal
fishers and their families-only 9% had ever refused to eat walleye in a
group setting such as a feast or a ceremonial gathering.2 °7 This is also likely
the case for members of the fishing tribes in the Pacific Northwest. As the
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission explains: "Salmon and the
rivers they use are a part of our sense of place. The Creator put us here
where the salmon return. We are obliged to remain and to protect this
place., 20 8 Moreover, various tribes' aboriginal and treaty-based claims to
the fish and other resources are tied to specific places; the legal protections
that flow from these claims cannot simply be re-established somewhere
else. 2 9  As well, the particularized skills and ecological knowledge that
these peoples have developed over generations are place specific and,
therefore, not transferable to other locations.
4. Risk Avoidance Has Finite Possibilities
Risk avoidance is an approach with diminishing and, ultimately, finite
possibilities. Once contaminants are introduced or permitted to remain in
the environment, there may be few options-perhaps even no options-for
avoiding contact with them. The options that do exist, moreover, are likely
205. See NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 91-93 (quoting fishers along
the Columbia Slough in Oregon and the Detroit River in Michigan).
206. Id. at 91-93.
207. GREAT LAKES INDIAN FISH & WILDLIFE COMM'N, 1993 SURVEY OF TRIBAL SPEARERS, att.
2, at 1, 5 (1993); see also Sue Erickson, 2004 Treaty Spearing and Netting Season Fast and Furious,
MAZINA'IGAN: A CHRONICLE OF THE LAKE SUPERIOR OJIBWE, Summer 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.glifwc.org/pub/mazinaigan/Summer2004.pdf (discussing the importance of walleye,
muskellunge, northern pike, and lake trout to tribal fishers and their families).
208. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, The Importance of Salmon to the Tribes,
available at http://www.critfc.org/text/salmcult.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
209. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp.
1420, 1422 (W.D. Wis. 1987); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
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to diminish over time, as uncontaminated environments are permitted one
by one to become and remain degraded. Ultimately, heavy reliance on risk
avoidance in lieu of risk reduction would leave no healthful alternatives.
The options for risk avoidance may be few. Some pollutants can be
more readily avoided than others, and some resources can be more readily
replaced by surrogates. For example, a fisher seeking to avoid PCB
contamination might be able to alter his preparation methods (trimming the
skin and fat from fillets and broiling or grilling so that the fat drips off
while cooking)--but to continue to fish at his customary sites and for his
customary species. 210 A fisher seeking to avoid mercury contamination, by
contrast, cannot do so merely by altering her preparation methods, because
methylmercury accumulates in the muscle tissue that comprises the fillet.21'
Instead, she must take steps to reduce her total consumption of particular
species caught from contaminated waters and to pace her allowable intake
to avoid acute exposure. In some cases, she may need to eliminate her
consumption altogether.
Further, the more risk avoidance is allowed to supplant risk reduction,
the fewer the options for risk avoidance. To the extent that advisories
redirect consumption to less contaminated fish species,2t 2 to smaller fish of
contaminated species, 1 3 or to other sources of protein, these alternative
species and resources may become overburdened and systematically tapped
out. To the extent that frequent ozone alerts prompt Southern Californians
to move out of the city, air pollution may be increased in the surrounding
suburbs as a result of these individuals' longer commutes.214 Ultimately,
heavy reliance on risk avoidance would lead to a world in which there are
no longer any healthful alternatives, as uncontaminated environments are
permitted one by one to become and remain degraded. Eventually, if
210. PCBs are lipophilic and thus accumulate in a fish's fatty tissue. See, e.g., EPA, PCBS
UPDATE, supra note 8, at 1, 4. Even the relatively expansive options for avoiding PCBs in fish may be
inappropriate from the perspective of some groups. The suggestion that preparation and cooking
methods be altered may be perceived as a cultural affront and may be resisted. See generally NEJAC
FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 90-127.
211. EPA, MERCURY UPDATE, supra note 7, at 2.
212. See, e.g., EPA, MERCURY ADVISORY FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, supra note 16
(directing those at risk to eat up to twelve ounces per week of the following fish, which are low in
mercury: "shrimp, canned light tuna, salmon, pollock and catfish").
213. See, e.g., Wis. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., HOOK INTO HEALTHY FISH!, available at
http://www.dnr.wi.gov/org/water/fhp/fish/pages/consumption/hookintohealthyfishO6.pdf;
CHOOSE WISELY: A HEALTH GUIDE FOR EATING FISH IN WISCONSIN, available at
http://www.dnr.wi.gov/org/water/fip/fish/pages/consumption/Fish%20Advisory%206%20web%201o.p
df (advising women of childbearing age and children under the age of fifteen not to consume any
walleye larger than a certain size from particular Wisconsin waters, e.g., no larger than seventeen inches
from English Lake and no larger than twenty inches from Siskiwit Lake).
214. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 112, at 281.
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mercury emissions were to continue unabated, there would be no "safe"
species of fish and no lakes free of contamination. If C8 (perflourooctanoic
acid and its salts) were to remain untreated in every aquifer, there would be
no water left to bottle.21 5
5. Risk Avoidance May Itself Introduce Risks
Risk avoidance may itself introduce risks. If those exposed change
their ways in order to avoid risks posed by contamination, they may adopt
practices that subject them to a different set of risks. To the extent that
asthmatic children heed warnings to avoid sports and other activities
outdoors on "ozone alert" days, for example, they may face an increased
risk of obesity and other ills that attend a more sedentary lifestyle.21 6 To the
extent that those affected "comply" with fish consumption advisories, the
potential for countervailing risks is a serious concern. The nutritional
benefits of frequent fish consumption are well known: fish are an efficient
source of protein, omega-3 fatty acids, selenium, and other nutrients
important to human health.217 For example, frequent fish consumption is
associated with a lower risk of stroke,21 8 a lower risk of Alzheimer
disease,219 and, most recently, a decreased rate of cognitive decline with
age.220 By foregoing fish consumption, people may open themselves to an
215. See Bottled Water Mandated by Suit Is Tainted, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at A9
(describing an instance in which bottled water provided by DuPont as part of a settlement was
contaminated with trace amounts of the same chemical, C8 (perflourooctanoic acid and its salts), that
had contaminated the wells that were the subject of the lawsuit; DuPont agreed to provide bottled water
to some 1000 residents until it installs filters at water treatment plants to remove the C8).
216. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 112, at 280.
217. See, e.g., Renate D. Kimbrough, Consumption ofFish: Benefits and Perceived Risk, 33 J.
TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 81, 82-83 (1991) (stating that fish generally offer definite health
benefits, such as providing a good source of protein, while containing less saturated fats and cholesterol
than other sources of food).
218. See, e.g., Richard F. Gillum et al., The Relationship Between Fish Consumption and Stroke
Incidence: The NHANES I Epidemiologic Follow-Up Study, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 537, 542
(1996) (finding a lower incidence of stroke in women who consumed fish more than once a week than in
those who never ate fish); Hiroyasu Iso et al., Intake of Fish and Omega-3 Fatty Acids and Risk of
Stroke in Women, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 304, 311 (2001) (examining the relationship between
consumption of fish and omega-3 fatty acids and reduced risk of stroke in women); Sirving 0. Keli et
al., Fish Consumption and Risk of Stroke: The Zutphen Study, 25 STROKE 328, 331 (1994) (finding an
association between incidence of strokes and consuming at least one portion of fish weekly). But see
Anthony J. Orencia et al., Fish Consumption and Stroke in Men: 30-year Findings of the Chicago
Western Electric Study, 27 STROKE 204, 208 (1996) (showing "no significant relationship" between fish
consumption and a reduced stroke risk).
219. See, e.g., Martha Clare Morris et al., Consumption ofFish and N-3 Fatty Acids and Risk of
Incident Alzheimer Disease, 60 ARCH. NEUROL. 940, 944 (2003) (finding a correlation between fish
consumption and a decrease in the risk of Alzheimer disease).
220. Martha Clare Morris et al., Fish Consumption and Cognitive Decline with Age in a Large
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increased risk of these and other adverse health effects. Dietary substitutes
for fish, moreover, may be less nutritious or may introduce their own health
risks. For example, a recent study found a link between regular
consumption of red meat and an increased risk of breast cancer in
women. 221 In addition, for people who consume fish as part of a traditional
diet, such as those in the fishing tribes of the Pacific Northwest, the upper
Great Lakes, and elsewhere, regular consumption of fish and other
traditional foods may promote health and combat diabetes. Diabetes is a
particular concern for tribes given that the incidence of diabetes is "two to
three times as high among [American Indians and Alaska Natives] than
among all racial/ethnic populations combined. 2  One recent study
observes, "[t]he loss of traditional food sources is now recognized as being
directly responsible for a host of diet-related illnesses among Native
Americans, including diabetes, obesity, heart disease, tuberculosis,
hypertension, kidney troubles, and strokes. 223  Agencies may believe
themselves to have made informed choices and tradeoffs before opting for
risk avoidance. However, agency decision makers may not foresee fully the
roster of countervailing risks introduced by avoidance measures.
6. Risk Avoidance Discourages Diversity of Lifeways
Risk avoidance may discourage plural and diverse lifeways. Risk
avoidance measures may call upon risk-bearers to forego an array of
practices or pursuits-from frying fish caught in the Detroit River,224 to
breastfeeding their infants, to spearing walleye, to allowing their children to
play outdoors in the summer, to giving their babies clams on which to
teethe.2 25 If risk-bearers are faced with engaging in these activities only at
the risk of exposure to unhealthful levels of environmental contaminants,
Community Study, 62 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 1849, 1851 (2005).
221. Eunyoung Cho et al., Red Meat Intake and Risk of Breast Cancer in Premenopausal
Women, 166 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2253 (2006).
222. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Health Disparities Experienced by American
Indians and Alaska Natives, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 697, 697 (2003), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm5230.pdf.
223. KARl MARIE NORGAARD, THE EFFECTS OF ALTERED DIET ON THE HEALTH OF THE KARUK
PEOPLE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 1, 5, 27 (2004), available at
http ://friendsoftheriver.org/PressRoon/PDF/HealthEffectsOfAlteredDiet.pdf (citation omitted)
(documenting the dramatic shift in diet of the Karuk people since European contact due to denied access
to and diminished quality and quantity of a significant percentage of their traditional foods, including
salmon and noting the resulting high incidence of diabetes-at 12%, nearly twice the national average-
and of heart disease-at 39.6%, nearly three times the national average--among the Karuk).
224. NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 96 (summarizing a study
concluding that frying fish is a tradition in African American communities).
225. Id. at 35.
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few may feel they can continue to do So. 226 Over time, the practices may
fall into disuse, the lifeways may die out. A shift to risk avoidance is likely
to have a chilling effect in particular on "outlier" practices-those thought
by the dominant or majority population not to be valuable, natural, or
necessary. However, this is not always the case, as avoidance measures
sometimes touch more mainstream practices-particularly if avoidance will
fall primarily to subpopulations who are few in number, politically
disempowered, or are historically discriminated against. And, to the extent
that decision makers rely increasingly on risk avoidance, it may be that
more and more practices and pursuits get restricted or prohibited entirely.
In any event, considerable losses attend a loss of diversity, impacting the
practitioners themselves, the ethnocultural groups of which they are a part,
and society as a whole.
The value of diversity in numerous public and private spheres is well
recognized. 227  Ensuring the flourishing of plural and diverse lifeways is
justified on both instrumental and intrinsic grounds. When we as a society
encourage diversity in this context, we decline to commit to a single course
of action. We thereby enhance the chances of identifying innovative or
optimal alternatives in the face of social challenges. Conversely, we guard
against errors in predicting which practices or lifeways are likely to succeed
and which are to fail. This function becomes especially important where
there are "gaps in society's understanding of cause[s] and effect[s], '228 as is
the case with much of the science underlying environmental issues. When
we as a society encourage diversity here we also uphold normative
commitments to cultural self-determination and the flourishing of multiple
cultures. Some practices may be central to the cultural identity of particular
groups. As elaborated below, fish, fishing, and fish consumption define
who the various Ojibwe and other Great Lakes tribes and bands are as
peoples.229 Members of any cultural group, whether in the minority or
majority, have a right to society's respect for the integrity of their culture.
226. This may be the case, for example, when women learn that their breast milk contains
chemical contaminants, which may be passed on to their nursing babies. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling,
Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REv. 103, 104 (2005).
Nursing mothers in many parts of the world have disturbingly high concentrations
of industrial chemicals in their breast milk. ... Some scientists have hypo-
thesized that one reason why women who breastfeed their children have a lower
risk of cancer is that they have (unwittingly) dumped some of their chemical load
into their own babies' bodies.
Id.
227. David Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American Principle, 70 Mo. L. REV. 777, 781
(2005) (addressing the benefits and importance of diversity in "public and private spheres").
228. Id.
229. See discussion infra note 236 and accompanying text.
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However, because society is more likely to breach this right with regard to
cultural groups in the numerical minority or in an otherwise non-dominant
position, particular vigilance is warranted in this case. This is especially so
where there have been historical efforts to assimilate the group and
denigrate its culture. 230 Finally, when we encourage diversity of practices
and lifeways, we evince esteem for-and delight in-diversity for its own
sake. Although a particular practice may not ultimately serve any useful
end and may not feature prominently in any group's understanding of itself
as a culture or a people, the practice may nonetheless be one among a
multitude of human ways-and we, as a society, might value the existence
of this multitude. 3'
7. Risk Avoidance Is Unjust
Risk avoidance is often unjust. The burden of undertaking risk
avoidance measures is likely to fall disproportionately on tribes and
indigenous peoples, other communities of color, and low-income
communities. This is so because members of these groups are likely to be
among the most exposed to environmental contaminants. 232  These
individuals are more likely to live near multiple sources of air pollution,
thereby inhaling relatively greater doses and mixes of hazardous air
pollutants;233 they are more likely to live within or near Superfund sites,
230. See, e.g., S. James Anaya, Ethnic Group Rights, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS
NOMOS XXXIX, 222, 228-29 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997); see also O'Neill, Variable
Justice, supra note 109, at 94-98.
231. Consider the following example. One commentator decries the effect of Wal-Mart's
extraordinary buying power on the diversity of offerings at grocery stores: because Wal-Mart carries
only the top two national brands in any category, and because food producers have responded in many
cases by eliminating the items that do not make this cut, "the seventh brand of mustard"--along with an
array of choices along multiple dimensions-may simply become unavailable. Nina Teicholz, The
World According to Sam, GOURMET 100, 108 (June 2005).
232. Although this claim is not uncontested, it is fair to say that it is, on balance, supported by
the weight of the evidence. For useful catalogs and syntheses of the relevant studies, see LUKE W. COLE
& SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND Up: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 54, app. at 167 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., New
York University Press 2001); CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION 55 (2002).
233. See, e.g., COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, FROM PLANTATIONS
TO PLANTS: REPORT OF THE EMERGENCY NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC
JUSTICE IN ST. JAMES PARISH, LOUISIANA Tbls.l & Ii (Charles Lee & Damu Smith coordinators, Sept.
15, 1998) (comparing toxic air pollutant releases in St. James Parish with the United States average and
noting that annual releases in St. James Parish were 30,560 pounds per square mile and 360 pounds per
person, whereas releases in the United States were only 382 pounds per square mile and seven pounds
per person), available at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/convent-report.html.
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coming in contact with contaminated soils; 234 and they are likely to
consume fish in larger quantities, at greater frequencies, and in accordance
with different practices, ingesting greater doses of mercury, PCBs, dioxins,
and other contaminants.235
This general observation is borne out in the examples of risk avoidance
canvassed above. Whereas members of the general population, especially
those who do not consume fish, are not much affected by a turn to
advisories in lieu of reduced mercury contamination, members of the
Ojibwe tribes and other fishing peoples will be asked to "choose" between
curtailing severely their fish intake or being exposed to methylmercury in
the fish they eat at levels determined to be unsafe for humans. 36 Members
of these tribes consume fish in greater quantities, at higher frequencies, and
in accordance with different seasonal cycles and cultural constraints than
members of the general population.2" Members of these tribes also tend to
consume different species and obtain their fish from different sources than
"the typical U.S. consumer eating a variety of fish from restaurants and
grocery stores '238 that is assumed by the EPA. According to studies
documenting fish consumption practices, relevant fish consumption rates
include 17.5 grams per day for members of the general U.S. population and
189.6 grams per day for fish consumers in the Great Lakes Indian Fish and
Wildlife Commission (GLIFWC) member tribes.239 Consequently, whereas
a woman consuming walleye at rates typical of the general U.S. population
will be exposed to methylmercury just at the EPA's current reference dose,
a woman consuming at rates typical of the GLIFWC member tribes will be
exposed to methylmercury at levels more than ten times the EPA's
reference dose.240  The Clean Air Mercury Rule delays and diminishes
regulatory efforts to address this status quo, relying instead on fish
consumption advisories. Somewhat remarkably, the EPA unflinchingly
234. See, e.g., JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS? THE SPATIAL AND
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 165 (1999). While nonwhites account for
24.2% of the U.S. population, they account for 35.1% of the population living within the boundaries of
the 1,173 NPL sites studied and 28.9% of the population living within four miles of these sites,
"indicating that these groups bear more of the potential exposures from Superfund sites." Id.
235. See, e.g., NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103.
236. O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 17, at 1, 110.
237. Id. at 11,075-79.
238. Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the
Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Steam-Generating Units; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652, 4685 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). This "typical U.S. consumer," EPA assures, "is not in danger of
consuming harmful levels of methylmercury from fish and is not advised to limit fish consumption." Id.
239. O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 17, at 11,093.
240. Id.
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acknowledges that it will be "Native Americans, Southeast Asian
Americans, and lower income subsistence fishers" who will be subject to
these avoidance measures.24'
Similarly, Oregon's decision to adopt water quality standards based on
the national default fish consumption rate of 17.5 grams per day vastly
understates consumption by members of the Umatilla and other fishing
tribes. Surveys of contemporary consumption by members of the Columbia
River Basin tribes have documented fish intake of 97.2-130 grams per day
at the 90th percentile, 389 grams per day at the 99th percentile, and 972
grams per day as a maximum value.242  Surveys of contemporary
consumption by tribal elders and traditional and subsistence fishers in the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation have documented
an average fish intake of 540 grams per day.243  Moreover, these
contemporary consumption rates represent consumption that is
"suppressed" from treaty-protected levels-levels that tribal members once
did, and are still entitled to, consume. 244  Those tribal members who
consume the greatest quantities of fish are the most exposed to the host of
contaminants regulated by reference to ODEQ's water quality standards.
The Agriculture Street Landfill is located in a New Orleans
neighborhood that is 98% African American.245 It is known as "The Black
Love Canal. 246 There is evidence that, beginning in 1969, federal and local
governments encouraged low- and middle-income African Americans to
populate the residential neighborhoods that, unbeknownst to these residents,
were constructed on top of the former landfill.247 When the contamination
came to light, these residents met with initial agency reticence to cleanup
under CERCLA, finally succeeding in 1994 to get the site placed on the
241. Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the
Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Steam-Generating Units; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
242. See O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 109, at 52, tbl. 1; CRITFC, supra note 35.
243. Harris & Harper, A Native American Exposure Scenario, supra note 35, at 791.
244. See, e.g., O'Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest, supra note 41; STUART G. HARRIS &
BARBARA L. HARPER, CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION, EXPOSURE
SCENARIO FOR CTUIR TRADITIONAL SUBSISTENCE LIFEWAYS (2004),
available at http://www.hhs.oregonstate.edu/ph/tribal-grant/CTUIR-Scenario.doc (contending that the
relevant baseline for treaty-protected rights to fish is the level of tribal fish consumption at the time of
the treaty's signing in 1855).
245. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES DISEASE REGISTRY, supra note 176, at 3 (citing 2000
census data).
246. MEMBER SCHOLARS OF THE CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM (CPR), CPR PUB. NO. 512, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE
KATRINA 20 (2005), available at http://www.progressivereforn.org/UnnaturalDisaster512.pdf.
247. Id. at 20, 47 n.84.
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At the Bunker Hill Mining and Metallurgical Site in Coeur d'Alene,
more than 7000 people reside within the site boundaries, approximately
30% of whom live below the poverty line.249 In addition, members of the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe are among the most exposed, given that their
traditional cultural practices include subsistence, medicinal, and ceremonial
uses of resources contaminated by mining activities at the site.2
According to the Human Health Risk Assessment,
it is clear that a subsistence-based lifestyle requires
environmental lead levels orders of magnitude lower than those
measured throughout the floodplain of the Coeur d'Alene River.
... Predictions for [blood lead levels] associated with
subsistence activities ... would significantly exceed all health
criteria for children or adults.
251
More generally, a prominent study has shown that less protective
cleanup methods, such as capping, comprise the preferred remedy 7% more
frequently at sites in predominantly non-white communities than in
predominantly white communities.252 Conversely, treatment constitutes the
preferred remedy 22% more often at sites in predominantly white
253communities than in predominantly non-white communities. As well,
cleanup efforts were significantly delayed in predominantly non-white
communities--commencing 12% to 42% later than in predominantly white
communities.25 And although data are sparse, it may be that institutional
controls are being employed more often in non-white communities than in
white communities.255
Additionally, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely than
their white counterparts to live in counties in which one or more national
248. Id. at 20.
249. REGION 10, EPA, BUNKER HILL SITE DESCRIPTION, supra note 65, at 8, 13.
250. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, SUPERFUND AND MINING MEGASITES, supra note 66, at 179-80.
251. Id. (quoting Terra Graphics et al., Human Health Risk Assessment, 6-2, 6-51 (2001)).
252. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle et al., Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental
Law, NAT'L. L. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1-S12. Note that this study has been criticized. Subsequent
studies of the same or similar cases have variously confirmed or refuted its conclusions. For discussion,
see EILEEN GAUNA ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 4-5, 7-8
(2005), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/ej_505.pdf.
253. Id. at 7.
254. Id.
255. See Erwin Tam, Analysis of Institutional Controls at California Superfund Sites
(unpublished paper, available electronically at
http://ist socrates.berkeley.edu/--es196/projects/2000fina/tam.pdf) (finding unfair implementation of
institutional controls within California).
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ambient air quality standard is exceeded.5 6 African Americans are sent to
the emergency room because of asthma at five times the rate of whites; they
are hospitalized for asthma treatment at three times the rate of whites; and
they die from asthma at twice the rate of whites.257
Moreover, risk avoidance measures are likely to be evaluated by
reference to the understandings and commitments of the dominant society
and adopted only where avoidance is thought not to occasion great costs or
profound loss. 25 8 Yet, the understandings and commitments of those who
will be faced with altering their practices and lifeways may be quite
different than those of the dominant society. This will often be the case
where Native peoples are prominent among the risk-bearers and may also
be the case when other non-dominant groups are at risk. Thus,
environmental injustice here arises not only from distributive inequities but
also from cultural discrimination. For example, not only are the Ojibwe
and other fishing peoples the ones most heavily burdened by reliance on
fish consumption advisories, but they are also likely to understand
differently the nature of this burden than do members of the dominant
society.259 For the fishing tribes of the Great Lakes, as for fishing peoples
elsewhere, fish, fishing, and fish consumption are central to their identity as
peoples. Fish and the lifeways associated with fish are indispensable to
these peoples' physical, social, economic, political, spiritual, and cultural
health. 260  For the dominant society, by contrast, these practices may be
valued for a variety of reasons, but they are likely thought expendable.
Thus, for example, a woman in the general population who habitually
consumes two meals of fish per week might, when faced with fish
consumption advisories for mercury, look to substitute food sources with
relatively modest accommodations to palate and pocketbook. A woman in
the Mille Lacs Band, however, might view such risk avoidance measures as
impossible, given the affront this would mean to her tribe's very identity, to
what it means to be Ojibweg. 261  By permitting significant mercury
contamination to remain and relying instead on fish consumption
256. See, e.g., BLACK LEADERSHIP FORUM ET AL., AIR OF INJUSTICE: AFRICAN AMERICANS &
POWER PLANT POLLUTION 3 (2002) (noting that "71% of African Americans live in counties that
violate[d] federal air pollution standards [in 2002], compared to 58% of the white population"); LEAGUE
OF UNITED LATIN AM. CITIZENS, AIR OF INJUSTICE: How AIR POLLUTION AFFECTS THE HEALTH OF
HISPANICS AND LATINOS 3 (2004) (noting that 71% of Hispanics live in counties that violated federal air
pollution standards in 2002).
257. AM. LUNG ASS'N, MINORITY LUNG DISEASE DATA 2000, at 4 (2000). See generally
BLACK LEADERSHIP FORUM ET AL., supra note 256, at 3.
258. See O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13.
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advisories, EPA perpetuates a long history of cultural discrimination against
American Indian peoples.262
Finally, any cost savings generated by a shift to risk avoidance will be
enjoyed primarily by the sources that produce contaminants and not the
people who are exposed to them in the environment. This fact-that the
societal winners are not actually required to compensate the societal
losers-is often glossed over by those touting the cost savings or efficiency
gains of this and similar moves away from risk reduction. Such cost
savings are defended because they make "society" better off-they are
efficient according to the Kaldor-Hicks (or "potential Pareto") criterion.263
By this test, an outcome is deemed efficient if the net (monetized) benefits
are increased, that is, if the winners will gain more than the losers will lose
(such that they could, in theory, compensate the losers). However, as
Amartya Sen has observed, this criterion would permit decisions that make
the rich richer and the poor poorer: "the potential for improvement in
Pareto's terms-the fact that compensation could have been paid so that the
poor didn't become poorer-does not justify the reality of increased
poverty.1264
C. On Balance
Of course, the case for risk avoidance must be considered in view of
the case against it and vice versa. Several of the arguments on either side
should be qualified or modified as a result. This section explores how the
various claims fare, on balance.
1. Considerable Cost Savings-By a Partial Accounting
The case for risk avoidance is supported by an important and enticing
claim. Risk avoidance measures can provide "the same amount of human
health protection" at a much lower cost than the relevant risk reduction
strategies. Can risk avoidance deliver on this promise? As noted above, the
cost savings are potentially quite large. This claim, therefore, deserves
serious attention. Much social good could be accomplished with an extra
262. See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 230, at 228-29 (recounting the history of cultural
discrimination in what is now the United States).
263. Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696
(1939).
264. ACKERMAN & HENZERLING, supra note 135, at 35 (citing Amartya Sen); see also Amartya
Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 947-48 (2000) (discussing reality
of loss for societal "losers" in the absence of compensation).
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$100 million. However, the figures cited tend to be based on a partial
accounting.
Where cost data exist, they are especially incomplete. Efforts to
estimate the costs of institutional controls, for example, have to date failed
adequately to incorporate the costs of implementing, monitoring, reporting,
and enforcing over the entire life of the institutional control-a period that
could last decades, if not in perpetuity.265  In fact, as EPA has itself
acknowledged, "once the total life-cycle costs of implementing, monitoring
and enforcing an [institutional control]-which may exceed 30 years-are
fully calculated, it may actually be less costly in the long term to implement
a remedy that requires treatment of the waste. ' 2  Note, too, that cost data
here tend to be incomplete in asymmetric ways: the costs of engineering
controls are more fully characterized and more readily quantified than the
costs of institutional controls. 267 As well, such tallies tend to neglect the
economic benefits of prevention, reduction, or cleanup.268 At the Bunker
Hill Mining and Metallurgical Site, for example, cleanup activities are
estimated to have contributed $77.4 million to the state and local economy
as of 2003.269
Moreover, the proponents' claim is actually a narrow one and should
be stated more precisely: risk avoidance can provide the same amount of
human health protection from a target risk due to the direct mechanism of
environmental fate, transport, and exposure contemplated by the particular
avoidance measure. That is to say, if one adds to the ledger the costs of
addressing the adverse human health effects due to (1) indirect mechanisms;
(2) human health endpoints other than the target risk; and (3) introduced
risks, the costs of obtaining the "same amount of human health protection"
would be greatly increased.
Estimates of cost savings would need to be reduced to account for risk
265. E-mail from Michael Bellot, Director, Institutional Controls Program, EPA to author (Aug.
31, 2005), supra note 103; Telephone Interview with Michael Bellot, Director, Institutional Controls
Program, EPA (June 17, 2005). As noted above, EPA is in the process of improving its ability to
estimate institutional control costs, and, among other things, has enlisted contractors to assist in this
effort. See, e.g., JOHN PENDERGRASS & KATHLEEN PROBST, ESTIMATING THE COST OF INSTITUTIONAL
CONTROLS 9-10 (2005), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-Report-costs.pdf (noting
EPA's recommendation to evaluate costs for institutional controls).
266. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS: A SITE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO
IDENTIFYING, EVALUATING AND SELECTING INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS AT SUPERFUND AND RCRA
CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANUPS 8 (2000).
267. See, e.g., Heinzerling, Risking It All, supra note 226, at 113 (arguing that cost-benefit
analyses "skew against environmental protection" because benefits such as "human lives saved, human
illnesses averted, and ecological harms" are difficult to quantify).
268. Id.
269. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPERFUND FACT SHEET: BUNKER HILL "Box" 2 (2003),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/Rl 0/CLEANUP.NSF (follow "Bunker Hill 'The Box.' hyperlink).
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 31 Vt. L. Rev. 327 2006-2007
Vermont Law Review
avoidance's failure to address indirect human health effects. As noted
above, contaminants introduced or allowed to remain in the environment
may indirectly affect human health: they may deplete the resources on
which humans depend, or they may migrate or otherwise behave in ways
not predicted, eventually exposing humans to risk. Even some proponents
have acknowledged that the beneficiaries of risk avoidance will be limited
to the current generation, for example, touting the cost savings of
institutional controls "at least in the short run. 2 7° John Pendergrass has
suggested that institutional controls may ultimately fail-and so require
sites to be reopened in the future for further cleanup-at as many as 100%
of non-National Priorities List sites that have not achieved unrestricted use
standards.2 7' In some instances, moreover, it may be that costs are not only
deferred but ultimately increased, as future generations are left to deal with
a pollution problem made worse by time and inattention.
Estimates of cost savings would also need to be reduced to account for
risk avoidance's failure to address non-target risks. As discussed above,
health endpoints other than those targeted by risk avoidance measures may
adversely affect human health. Gayer and Hahn's estimate of the cost
savings from less protective mercury regulations,272 for example, would
need to be reduced considerably if methylmercury's adverse effects on adult
cardiovascular systems were also accounted for.273 Indeed, as Samuel
Rascoff and Richard Revesz have documented, risk reduction measures
often have ancillary benefits: because they reduce contamination at the
source, they reduce all of the consequent human health risks-including
risks from endpoints other than those specifically targeted.274
270. Daniel S. Miller, Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Federal Agency Opposition to State
Institutional Control Laws, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,115, 11,115 (Sept. 2002).
271. John Pendergrass, Institutional Controls in the States: W/hat Is and Can Be Done to Protect
Public Health at Brownfields, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1303, 1312 (2003).
272. See Gayer & Hahn, supra note 132, at 28 (estimating the costs and benefits of mercury
regulation).
273. The Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, for example, assessed the human health benefits of
mercury emissions reductions under various proposals for regulating coal-fired utilities. In addition to
finding potential benefits to children from reduced neurological damage ranging between $75 million to
$119 million annually, it found potential benefits to adult males from reduced cardiovascular disease
ranging from $3.3 billion to $4.9 billion annually. GLENN RICE & JAMES K. HAMMITT, HARVARD CTR.
FOR RISK ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC VALUATION OF HUMAN HEALTH BENEFITS OF CONTROLLING
MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM U.S. COAL-FIRED PLANTS xvii-xviii (2005), available at
http://bronze.nescaum.org/airtopics/mercury/rptOS03l5mercuryhealth.pdf. For a discussion of this and
other issues surrounding the estimates of costs and benefits of regulating mercury from coal-fired
utilities, see RENA I. STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM: How POLLUTION AND HOLLOW
GOVERNMENT HURT OUR KIDS (forthcoming Fall/Winter 2007).
274. Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk TradeoffAnalysis: Towards
Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1802-08 (2002)
[Vol. 31:273
HeinOnline  -- 31 Vt. L. Rev. 328 2006-2007
No Mud Pies
Introduced risks, too, are a potentially large cost of a move to risk
avoidance. To the extent that risk-bearers substitute new practices for those
that entail risk, they may open themselves to new-and costly-risks.
Consider, for example, the increased incidence of diabetes among Native
peoples that is associated with the move away from a traditional diet due to
depletion and contamination of fish and other resources.275  Diabetes is
emerging as a serious public health concern, with staggering costs along
multiple dimensions.276 As one recent account puts it: "Diabetes threatens
to hamper some of society's most basic functions. 277  Although other
factors are also believed to be at play, the increased incidence of diabetes in
the United States is attributable in important part to shifts over the last few
decades in humans' diets and activity levels.278 The disproportionate
number of immigrants and Native Americans with diabetes underscores the
connection: "[N]ewcomers eating [contemporary] American diets for the
first time are especially vulnerable." 279  Or consider, for example, the
increased rate of obesity among Americans-which the ozone alerts'
admonitions to refrain from exercise outdoors does not help--and its
attendant costs. 280 And while risk reduction strategies may also introduce
risks,28' it is arguable that the profound behavioral changes demanded by
many risk avoidance measures will be unmatched in scope and effect. Risk
avoidance often asks risk-bearers to alter practices or lifeways in which
they have long engaged in favor of untried alternatives. The potential
harms introduced by these alternatives may be serious, as humans are left to
adapt in short order to dramatic shifts in dietary and other practices-
practices that had evolved over generations.282
(citing instances of unintended ancillary benefits from health and environmental regulations).
275. See NORGAARD, supra note 223, at 17, 22, 26 (discussing the causes and consequences of
the move away from the traditional Native American diet).
276. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES FACT SHEET
(2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/pdf/ndfs_2005.pdf (discussing a host of
complications from diabetes, ranging from kidney disease, to blindness, to adverse effects on pregnancy,
and estimating total costs of diabetes at $132 billion).
277. N. R. Kleinfield, Diabetes and Its Awful Toll Quietly Emerge as a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2006, at Al.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Emmett B. Keeler et al., The External Costs of a Sedentary Life-Style, 79 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 975, 975 (1989) (concluding that "the lifetime subsidy from others to those with a
sedentary lifestyle is $1900" at a discount rate of 5%).
281. John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VS. RISK:
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT i, I (John D. Graham & Jonathan
Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
282. For a popular account that nonetheless synthesizes a rich technical literature, see generally
GARY PAUL NABHAN, WHY SOME LIKE IT HOT: FOOD, GENES, AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY (2004)
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Additionally, the claim that risk avoidance can provide "the same
amount of human health protection" for less cost excludes on its face the
other benefits of environmental risk regulation. As noted above, risk
avoidance strategies miss entirely the adverse effects of contamination on
all non-human components of ecosystems. Risk reduction measures, by
contrast, produce ancillary benefits in the form of environmental health
protection. As a consequence, were "the same amount of environmental
health protection" to be added to the calculus, the cost savings from risk
avoidance would again need to be decreased substantially.
As well, the claim that risk avoidance can provide "the same amount of
human health protection" tends not to reflect an understanding of the term
"human health" that comprises spiritual, cultural, and other aspects of
human well-being. Although it is not possible to monetize effects along
these dimensions, it can nonetheless fairly be said that any effort to account
for these adverse effects would again mean that the "costs" of risk
avoidance would need to be increased.
The claimed cost savings to be garnered from risk avoidance, then, are
likely to be substantially overstated and enjoyed primarily in the short term.
But, proponents might counter that even modest cost savings per measure
could add up across the panoply of environmental regulatory efforts. And
large regulatory expenditures might be expected to exact a toll in terms of
societal wealth and, therefore, health. 83 The response to this claim is two-
fold. First, as noted above, risk avoidance may in fact be more expensive
rather than less expensive than risk reduction over the long term. On any
proper accounting, then, risk avoidance will often fail to deliver even
"modest cost savings." Second, although the claim that regulation increases
mortality has attained something of the status of conventional wisdom, it
has been largely discredited. Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, for
example, have painstakingly charted-refuted-the multiple leaps required
(explaining that changes to long-established dietary habits lead to increased disease among ethnic
groups).
283. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN ET AL., Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY?
(2000) (criticizing health and safety regulations on the grounds that they do not efficiently reduce
mortality); Ralph Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147
(1990) (suggesting that each expenditure of $3 to $7.5 million produces the loss of one statistical life);
see also Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health
and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 43, 49 tbl. I (1994) (summarizing selected studies of
the relationship between income and health). But cf Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act
Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REv. 303, 375 (1999) ("The most adventurous claims for 'health-health'
comparisons arise when a costly regulation imposes health risks simply by virtue of its cost. ... But
these are adventurous claims, because they depend on contentious projections about the disemployment
effects of particular regulations.") (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, in FREE MARKETS
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 298, 298-317 (1997)).
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to link studies finding a statistical relationship between income level and
life expectancy (but only for incomes below $20,000) to claims that a
certain number of fatalities can be expected from health and environmental
regulations requiring expenditures by regulated entities. 284 Ina related vein,
Eban Goodstein has found there to be "no economy-wide trade-off'
285between jobs and the environment, pointing, among other things, to the
fact that "there are now well over two million people who work directly or
indirectly in environmentally related jobs"-a wealth-generating effect of
environmental regulation that tends to get ignored by those tallying
regulatory expenditures.
286
2. Risks Avoided-But Only in Theory
Can risk avoidance deliver on even its revised claim? That is, can it
provide "the same amount of human health protection from a target risk due
to the direct mechanism of environmental fate, transport and exposure
contemplated by the particular avoidance measure"? 287 The limited efficacy
of risk avoidance measures to date raises serious questions about whether
such approaches can actually garner "the same amount of human health
protection" understood in even this narrower sense. Consumption warnings
and ozone alerts reach as few as half of the people at risk, are understood by
only a fraction of those reached, and are followed by only a fraction of
those who understand them. Fences are frequently scaled. Institutional
controls are unreliably implemented, maintained, and enforced. Although
agencies have made some progress in improving risk communication-for
example, agencies now routinely translate fish consumption advisories into
multiple languages-it is clear that their efforts continue to fall far short.288
284. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 135, at 56-59 & nn.20-25; see also Frank
Ackerman, The Unbearable Lightness of Regulatory Costs, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1071, 1092 (2006)
(arguing that there is unlikely to be a significant trade-off between prosperity and regulation and
presenting evidence that mortality decreases during recessions and increases with employment).
285. EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH: FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 4 (1999); see also ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 135, at 58 (discounting the
theory that regulation is always economically detrimental); Ackerman, supra note 284, at 1092 (finding
that regulation does not cause net reduction in wealth).
286. GOODSTEIN, supra note 285, at 4.
287. See discussion supra Part II.C.I.
288. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FISH ADVISORY NEWSLETTER (2006), available at
http://epa.gov/waterscience/fish/advisories/newsjuly06.htm (recounting a study showing that the Stevens
Creek reservoir in California had elevated levels of mercury, as high as five times the state standard for
human health, but that signs had yet to be posted in Spanish and Vietnamese, as the local agency had
said it would do by the start of the 2005 fishing season); Dean Scott, EPA Considering Bilingual
Pesticide Labels to Aid Workers, Growing Hispanic Population, BNA DAILY ENV'T. REP., June 16,
2006, at A-I I (reporting that EPA is only in the early stages of its determination whether to require
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Indeed, a primary recommendation of the recent GAO review of
institutional controls addressed such agency failures. 289 At the very least,
real improvements in the efficacy of risk avoidance measures would require
substantial time and resources-investments -that must be added to the cost
side of the ledger.290 Given the nature of some of the hurdles, however, it is
doubtful whether even improved communication, implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement efforts could ever be completely effective at
getting people to change their lifeways. As Pendergrass concedes, "[i]t is
unlikely that such public health warnings [or notices] can be 100% effective
at preventing all the exposure to risk, because some people will not receive
the warning, some who receive it will not understand it, and some who
understand it will choose to ignore it.' '291 There is, ultimately, no guarantee
that risk avoidance will ever be able to effect the desired behavioral changes
in all those at risk-no guarantee that the chain joining environmental
contamination and adverse human health effects will in fact be broken.
Note, however, that noncompliance with warnings, fences, and other
prohibitions may be unproblematic from the perspective of those advancing
autonomy arguments. That is, so long as risk-bearers can be said to have
been adequately informed of the relevant risks, their choice not to comply
might properly be viewed as an exercise of their autonomy.292 As such, the
fact that significant numbers of risk-bearers do not comply with, for
example, fish consumption advisories does not (necessarily) suggest that
risk avoidance is not effective. To the contrary, it might signal that this risk
avoidance approach has functioned precisely as intended, by allowing each
individual to determine for herself the amount and kind of risk to which she
will be subjected. However, one of the premises of this argument, that risk-
bearers are fully informed of the competing risks, remains-and may
always remain--elusive. This fact is not a speed bump but a stop sign: it
may be fatal to an autonomy-based case for a shift to risk avoidance. There
are other, more fundamental problems with autonomy arguments in this
bilingual warning labels and use instructions). Note, too, that progress here has opportunity costs, as
agencies devote resources to refining risk avoidance strategies at the expense of risk reduction efforts.
See, e.g., id, (quoting an EPA official, who cited "resource implications" of bilingual pesticide labeling
for EPA, because the agency would have to develop a regulatory system to determine whether the
translated warnings and use instructions were accurate enough to protect workers and consumers).
289. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 191, at 34-35 (finding EPA's ongoing
implementation of institutional controls to be lacking).
290. See, e.g., NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 90-127 (discussing the
extensive changes that health and environmental agencies would need to undertake in order to address
the deficiencies in fish consumption advisories from the perspective of tribes, communities of color, and
low-income communities).
291. Pendergrass, Redevelopment of Brownfields, supra note 48, at 10,253.
292. W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 843, 851 (2000).
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context, including the point that expressed preferences may not represent
truly autonomous choices.293 This is so because preferences are structured
by one's circumstances-they are not endogenous to the legal rules that
allocate entitlements and wealth in the first place.294 As such, the claim that
we ought to defer without question to risk-bearers' apparent preferences for
greater levels of risk (i.e., when they do not comply with advisories or
warnings) requires further argument-it cannot be supported merely by the
existence of these preferences.
295
3. Autonomy, Responsibility, and Identity
Having conceded that risk avoidance measures will likely never be
100% effective, Pendergrass nonetheless concludes that, despite this flaw,
warnings and notices "remain a highly useful institutional control because
they are an inexpensive method of warning large populations about risk and
allowing individuals to reduce their own risk of exposure.', 296 Although this
point is somewhat ambiguously presented-it could be taken to support
either autonomy- or responsibility-based arguments-it raises an important
consideration: who is it that will be left to "reduce their own risk of
exposure?" Arguments that risk avoidance enhances autonomy or increases
individual responsibility take on new dimensions once one knows the
identity of those exposed and knows, therefore, who is likely to be asked to
undertake avoidance (or to "choose" not to do so). Among other things,
agencies can no longer claim to be debating the relevant questions in the
abstract, as if only identityless, "statistical" lives were at stake.
Given that risk avoidance strategies focus on the point of human
exposure, government decision makers must identify and gather
information about those exposed. As noted above, agencies need to learn
who these people are, how they live, and what they value. Additionally, if
agencies hope to improve risk communication to a level that would support
a contention that risk-bearers are indeed fully informed-a prerequisite for
autonomy-based claims-agencies' knowledge of those exposed would
need to become quite intimate.
293. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129, 1150 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Interference]; Robin L. West, Taking Preferences
Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 670-75 (1990) (arguing that an individual's or a community's
preferences may be "heavily influenced by, if not the product of, extant social structures" that are the
product of illegitimate "hierarchies of power" and that are often antithetical to the preference holder's
true interests).
294. See Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 293, at 1145-58.
295. Id.
296. Pendergrass, Redevelopment of Brownfields, supra note 48, at 10,253.
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In fact, agencies currently know or should know the identities of those
exposed in numerous contexts in which risk avoidance presents itself as
among the regulatory options. Notably, members of American Indian
tribes, people of color, and low-income individuals are disproportionately
among the most exposed to environmental contaminants. It is to these
individuals that the choice of risk avoidance will be offered and upon these
individuals that the responsibility for reducing risk will be placed.
Therefore, arguments from autonomy and responsibility must be evaluated
in light of this context, in light of the identifiability-and particular
identity--of the risk-bearers.
Among other things, the fact that those asked to undertake risk
avoidance are disproportionately members of American Indian tribes,
people of color, and low-income individuals ought to render problematic
any assertions about the sort of risks "they" would choose to accept, the sort
of avoidance "they" would find unobjectionable. When autonomy-based
claims are made chiefly by those unlikely to have to undertake avoidance
or, especially, by those who would benefit from weakened risk reduction
efforts, they become suspect.297 When they are also made with the
knowledge that those asked to undertake risk avoidance are
disproportionately people of color, members of American Indian tribes, and
low-income individuals, they become deeply troubling. 298  Similarly,
responsibility-based claims become objectionable where this is the case.299
There is a counterargument, however: the need for government
decision makers to avoid the ills of paternalism and to respect individual
risk-bearers' choices, as a matter of autonomy, is all the more acute where
those individuals have not in the past been respected as agents in public or
private spheres. The difficulty here comes with the term "choice." How do
government decision makers ascertain what individuals would choose in
this context? If such determinations are to be taken from expressions of
willingness-to-pay (WTP), they are hobbled by the problems introduced by
ability to pay. Given that risk-bearers tend to have lower incomes, the WTP
criterion systematically skews outcomes in favor of weakened risk
reduction. If such determinations are to be taken from expressions via the
political process, they are distorted by a history of discrimination and
resulting disempowerment for many of the groups disproportionately
among the risk-bearers. Again, this method threatens systematically to fail
297. See, e.g., supra notes 148 and accompanying text.
298. Id.
299. When these arguments take the form of "blame the victim," they are particularly troubling,
as they tap into sentiments underlying discriminatory practices that we as a society have disavowed. See
discussion supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
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to register the perspectives of risk-bearers. Can we simply ask those likely
to be among the risk-bearers? 3°° There is certainly an important role for
participation by those affected in any decision to opt for risk avoidance.
But, even here, a "choice" may not meaningfully exist when one's
circumstances place one over a barrel. 30 1 Although much more might be
said about these points, it seems that with even this sketch of the issues
before us, the identity of those who will be asked to undertake avoidance, or
to "choose" not to, means that autonomy- and responsibility-based claims
need to be evaluated in a different light than if we were all equally likely to
be among the risk-bearers.
4. Normalization or Homogenization?
To the extent that risk avoidance elicits behavioral changes, it can have
the effect of normalizing practices in a society in the sense of reducing the
number and variety of lifeways. Non-ordinary pursuits and practices are
likely to be the first to be discouraged and so the first to die out, although,
as observed above, if decision makers turn increasingly to risk avoidance, it
may be that a widening net will be cast. One might think this is all to the
good. Uniformity, among other things, begets efficiencies. If fish
consumption practices were similar across geographies and cultures, for
example, risk management efforts could dispense with the practical, legal,
and ethical issues that attend variability. On the other hand, one might
understand something to be lost as a result. One might value a diversity of
lifeways, as discussed above, because one values the potential societal
benefits, perhaps as yet undiscovered, to be obtained from some of the
various practices; because one supports cultural self-determination for the
practitioners; or because one delights in a multiplicity of practices and life
experiences. On this view, the specter of homogenization and
assimilation-even if inadvertent by-products of attaining other goals in
risk regulation-would bolster the case against reliance on risk avoidance.
The arguments for normalization also need to be evaluated in light of
the identity of those likely to be asked to undertake risk avoidance. The
300. See, e.g., Miguel Bustillo, Cleanups Fuel Debate: How Much Is Enough?, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2003, at Al (discussing the conflict between redevelopment of economically depressed areas
and strict environmental regulation).
301. Id.; see, e.g., THOMAS 0. McGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE
FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 271-72 (1993)
(challenging the assumption that low-paid workers in hazardous industries make "free and unconstrained
risk decisions" and suggesting that they "may be acting more out of desperation than of choice"); Cass
R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 19-24 ("Poverty is perhaps the most
severe obstacle to the free development of preferences and beliefs.").
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suggestion that practices are unnecessary or voluntary is more likely to be
made in the first place where it is tribes or other non-dominant groups that
will be asked to give up their ways. As such, this suggestion echoes efforts
throughout history to denigrate and discourage tribes' traditional, cultural,
and spiritual practices.0 2
5. Alternatives, Optimism, and Intergenerational Equity
The concern for the finite nature of the earth's resources remains: if
risk avoidance were allowed to supplant risk reduction, eventually, there
would be no uncontaminated environments and as a result, no healthful
alternatives. Risk avoidance, then, is a strategy of diminishing possibilities.
However, it is arguable that there might be some occasion for optimism
inasmuch as humans have shown ourselves to be resilient and creative.
Perhaps we should trust in our ability to invent new means of
decontaminating fouled environments, new alternatives for avoiding contact
with the contaminants that remain, or even new ways of perceiving the
options. Advances in desalinization technology, for example, might open
up the possibility that ocean waters could service human needs even if all
freshwater sources were to become contaminated or depleted.0 3 Such
solutions, of course, are highly speculative. Moreover, solutions may come
only far in the future, such that generations would be harmed in the
meantime.304 The solutions may themselves be extremely costly to bring to
application, such that the cost side of the ledger would have to be
recalculated. Or they may be unpalatable on moral, philosophical,
aesthetic, and other grounds.
30 5
On balance, a shift to risk avoidance in any particular instance is a
choice to forego a web of ancillary benefits, for human and ecological
health, for the current and, especially, future generations; to shift the
responsibility for addressing risk from risk-producers to risk-bearers-risk-
bearers who will necessarily be identified in the course of implementing the
risk avoidance measure and who may be members of groups entitled to
302. Anaya, supra note 230, at 228-29.
303. See, e.g., ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE
OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 81-82 (2002) (discussing the potential and limitations of desalinization
as an alternative to the use of groundwater).
304. See, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 232-47 (Richard Falk ed., United
Nations Univ. 1989) (1988) (contending that contamination to drinking water will result in inter-
generational inequity).
305. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1319-21 (1974) (discussing attitudes regarding the use of
surrogates for nature).
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particular consideration; to offer these risk-bearers one or a few specific
choices for avoidance-some or all of which may be impossible from their
perspectives, some or all of which may introduce their own roster of risks;
to prefer certain practices or ways of living over diverse alternatives; and to
opt for a strategy for risk regulation with diminishing and ultimately finite
possibilities. And this is only if all goes well-that is, if agencies can
remedy the numerous problems with communicating, implementing, and
enforcing in perpetuity the risk avoidance measure. Thus, it seems likely
that risk avoidance will be inappropriate in most instances. But, in any
particular instance, pollution problems may seem intractable and cost
savings may be large. To be sure, no one wants to pay any more for human
and ecological health protection than is necessary. How should decision
makers evaluate the relevant tradeoffs?
III. EVALUATING RISK AVOIDANCE
Risk avoidance charts a course that departs from current commitments
to risk reduction--commitments that are enshrined in environmental
statutes and other laws. As the discussion so far has suggested, it is a
course that is sometimes impermissible and often ill advised. For those
instances in which agencies or legislatures might permissibly contemplate
risk avoidance, however, we need a mode of analysis that allows them to
determine whether the departure is warranted. One decisional tool, cost-
benefit analysis, is currently prominent among the candidates. °6 But, I will
argue, it would be a mistake to evaluate a shift to risk avoidance by means
of cost-benefit analysis, a mistake to seek to rationalize risk regulation
solely in accordance with an efficiency criterion. This decisional tool
would undermine our ability to make considered decisions about the kind of
society we wish to be and the kind of world in which we wish to live. In its
quest for a certain brand of rationality, cost-benefit analysis narrows our
field of vision. It frames the discussion in a way that eliminates from view
many of the perils highlighted above. It fails to engage the crucial
questions "what is at stake, for whom?" in a move to risk avoidance. As a
consequence, it stands to sanction a departure from a collective
commitment to risk reduction without ever having demanded a response to
the basic questions involved-or having acknowledged that these questions
are on the table.
There is more at stake in the decision whether to rely on risk avoidance
306. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment
on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153 (2000) (discussing role of cost-benefit analysis in public
decision making).
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than is captured in the formulation "human health protection per dollar."
That is to say, even if risk regulation were rationalized along these lines, we
might be unsatisfied-indeed, troubled-by the result. There is a
difference between the question "how much risk?" and the question "which
risks are morally, culturally, and otherwise acceptable?" 3 7-or, as Annette
Baier puts it, "which harms to notice[?] ' ' 308 Risk avoidance, with its
attendant perils, brings to the fore important inadequacies with a focus
exclusively on the first question. This Part outlines recent calls for
increased rationality in risk regulation to be implemented, among other
things, by means of cost-benefit analysis in government decisions. This
Part argues that this decisional tool misframes the debate in ways that make
it ill suited to defend a shift to risk avoidance. Finally, this Part closes by
noting several considerations to be addressed by a properly framed debate
on the merits of risk avoidance in any particular instance.
A. Misframing the Debate: Rationalizing Risk Regulation
In order to think coherently about risk avoidance, we need to appreciate
what is at stake. Decisions about risk regulation adjudicate important
questions of value, in the process choosing among competing visions of the
ideal society. When these decisions are made by means of cost-benefit
analysis, however, these questions are not acknowledged; these choices are
made by default.
Should the human health risks of ground-level ozone be addressed by
reducing emissions of nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds from
the array of sources responsible for their release into the environment? Or
should these risks be addressed by asking asthmatic children to stay
indoors; by requiring construction workers to wear respirators; or by
advising those in sensitive subpopulations---e.g., those with emphysema-
to move to areas with better air quality? Should the human health risks of
methylmercury contamination be addressed by reducing emissions of
mercury from coal-fired power plants? Or should some of these risks be
addressed by warning women of childbearing age and children who eat fish
to reduce or eliminate fish from their diets? As the preceding discussion
has highlighted, the issues implicated by these tradeoffs are complex, with
307. Carl F. Cranor, The Use of Comparative Risk Judgments in Risk Management, in
TOXICOLOGY AND RISK ASSESSMENT: PRINCIPLES, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 817, 817 (Anna M.
Fan & Louis W. Chang eds., 1995).
308. Annette Baier, Poisoning the Wells, in VALUES AT RISK 49, 49 (Douglas MacLean ed.,
1986). "Morality is the culturally acquired art of selecting which harms to notice .... When is a public
policy that entails death for some and risk of death for more a policy that offends our moral standards?
Which deaths, and impositions of risk of death, are wrongful, and wrongs against those concerned?" Id.
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important-often, profound-questions adjudicated as a consequence.
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Much is at stake in decisions whether to rely on risk avoidance-much
that does not get encompassed by a calculus framed in terms of "human
health protection per dollar." Yet this calculus threatens to be the
touchstone for evaluating any shift to risk avoidance. As noted above, the
chief justification for risk avoidance is the cost savings it promises. 30 9 As
such, calls for a shift to risk avoidance tend to be advanced in these terms,
with advocates claiming that risk avoidance measures can provide the same
amount of human health protection for less cost than can risk reduction
approaches. These calls, further, come at a time when proponents of cost-
benefit analysis have ambitions that it become the dominant mode of
analysis in risk regulation.31° Indeed, Cass Sunstein has declared the arrival
of "the cost-benefit state."
31i
Cost-benefit analysis is a decisional tool that entails monetizing and
tallying the costs and benefits of a regulatory option.312 Many proponents
of cost-benefit analysis argue that it should be enlisted to determine whether
to proceed: a regulatory option may go forward where the net benefits
exceed the costs, but not otherwise.31 3 In general, these proponents argue
that regulatory efforts should be guided by an efficiency criterion.31 4 That
is, regulatory efforts should seek to maximize human health protection-or,
more precisely, human lives or "quality-adjusted life years" saved-per
309. See discussion infra Part II.B.I.
310. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1489 (2002) (arguing that a
more pervasive commitment to cost-benefit analysis would improve regulation).
311. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION ix (2002). But cf Heinzerling, supra note 226, at 112-13 ("Most of our environmental
laws do not require or even allow cost-benefit analysis.").
312. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 15-16 (1998)
(explaining the mechanics of cost-benefit analysis in the context of health and environmental
regulation).
313. Note that some proponents see a less determinative role for cost-benefit analysis,
suggesting that it be used merely to inform public debate about risk regulation. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN,
LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 139, at 129; Posner, supra note 306, at 1153-56 (discussing three roles for
cost-benefit analysis, including as a "decision rule"). One commentator questions "whether [cost-
benefit analysis] can provide any meaningful information at all." Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-
Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 241 (2004) (arguing that even when
used to inform public debate, cost-benefit analysis obscures rather than clarifies the reasons behind
government decision making).
314. See Posner, supra note 306, at 1153-56 (discussing use of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
criterion to evaluate government regulation via cost-benefit analysis).
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regulatory dollar spent."a 5 This goal is undergirded philosophically by a
welfarist claim that we ought, in public decisions, to maximize the
satisfaction of individual preferences.3 6 Each individual, it is said, is the
best judge of her own welfare; as such, public policies evince a respect for
human dignity and autonomy when they reflect these preferences.317 If risk
regulation were to be rationalized along these lines, proponents claim, all
would be well-indeed, all would be equitable. a18
In the context of risk regulation, cost-benefit analysis requires decision
makers to assign a monetary value to the relevant risk, typically by
discerning the monetary value that ordinary people would assign to the
risk.31 9 Ideally, according to proponents, decision makers would be able to
discern the amount of money that each person would be willing to pay to
reduce each particular risk that she faces. 320  Regulation could then track
willingness-to-pay (WTP), perfectly matching the level of regulatory
protection to each individual's preferences by providing him "no more and
no less than his WTP for each risk. 321 Practice departs from this ideal
(among other reasons) because of the administrative and other difficulties in
ascertaining every individual's WTP. and because of the collective nature
of the benefits at issue-improved air quality cannot feasibly be provided to
one without being provided to all.322 So decision makers enlist proxies
(e.g., they borrow valuations gleaned from occupational and other contexts
and so assume that an individual does not perceive differently different
sources of statistically equivalent risk), consider aggregates (e.g., they
assume that there is no difference among individuals in their views
respecting even the same risk), and otherwise muddle through (e.g., they
ignore the implications of the fact that one's WTP turns on one's ability to
pay), 23 ultimately assigning a dollar value to the risk that enables them to
315. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental Regulation,
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1003 (2006) (discussing various means of quantifying human health benefits,
including in terms of "quality-adjusted life years").
316. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 292, at 862 (stating that the "appropriate policy objective is
maximization of expected individual welfare, not risk minimization").
317. Id.
318. Id. But cf SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR supra note 139, at 129 (claiming that efficiency
ought not be the sole criterion for risk regulation and recognizing that distributive issues are simply not
considered in a cost-benefit inquiry).
319. See, e.g., SUNSTEiN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 139, at 130.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 146.
322. Id. at 147.
323. The various departures in practice from the idealized decisional tool that cost-benefit
analysis offers in theory leave Herman Leonard and Richard Zeckhauser to defend it thus: "it is not
perfect, but it is better than the alternatives." Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit
Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK, supra note 308, at 31, 34.
[Vol. 31:273
HeinOnline  -- 31 Vt. L. Rev. 340 2006-2007
No Mud Pies
determine whether, on balance, the costs of reducing it are warranted.
Recent efforts to hone this decisional tool have focused, moreover, on
correcting for irrationalities in ordinary people's assessments of risk.
Justice Stephen Breyer has argued that the failures of risk regulation are
attributable to a "vicious circle," fueled by irrational public perceptions of
risk.324 Cass Sunstein has similarly suggested that risk regulation's ills stem
from the numerous "cognitive blunders" that individuals make in evaluating
risk.32 5 Both Breyer and Sunstein essentially make a case for maximizing
the preferences individuals would have, were they more rational evaluators:
they argue that politically insulated experts should be entrusted with the
task of overriding the public's evaluations of risk in order to rationalize risk
regulation.326 Both Breyer and Sunstein allow that what appears to be
irrationalities in individuals' evaluations of risk may instead reflect
sentiments that are not irrelevant to public decisions regarding risk
regulation.327 However, both conclude that there should be a large, if not
decisive, role for insulated experts.
It would be a mistake, however, to evaluate a turn to risk avoidance
solely by means of cost-benefit analysis. As Frank Ackerman and Lisa
Heinzerling have documented, the shortcomings of cost-benefit analysis as
a decisional tool are many, infecting both its practical applications and its
theoretical underpinnings.328 Of particular importance here is the fact that
an inquiry framed in terms of maximizing "human health protection per
dollar" misses a variety of factors that are relevant to the determination of
which risks are morally, culturally, and socially acceptable. As Carl Cranor
observes, "[w]hat is important for public decisions is not only the
magnitude and probability of risks, but also a variety of factors that bear on
the acceptability of risks posed"--morally salient properties that we should
take into account in thinking coherently about risk regulation.329 When the
EPA tallied the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Mercury Rule, discussed
above, it concluded that reducing mercury emissions would cost coal-fired
utilities $160 million in 2010, $100 million in 2015, and $750 million in
2020.330 EPA pegged the benefits of reducing mercury emissions at
324. BREYER, supra note 125, at 33.
325. SUNSTErN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 139; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON:
SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 43-47 (2002) (suggesting that emotions and alarmist biases also
contribute to poor risk assessment).
326. BREYER, supra note 125, at 33-39; SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 139, at 124-27.
327. Id.
328. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 135.
329. Cranor, supra note 307, at 817.
330. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAN AIR
MERCURY RULE: FINAL REPORT 7-7, (2005), available at
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between $0.07 and $2.0 million.331 Leaving to the side concerns with
EPA's method,332 the larger question remains: what does this tally tell us-
and fail to tell us-about whether to require risk reduction in this instance?
It clearly suggests that the costs of risk reduction outweigh the benefits (so
tallied).333  But it does not tell us whether it is permissible for humans to
hasten the extinction of another species (e.g., the Florida panther, a species
that is currently endangered and among those adversely affected by
methylmercury contamination).334 It does not tell us whether it is tolerable
that members of a few discrete groups within the population (e.g., women
and children, Native peoples, and Southeast Asian Americans) will be
asked to bear the remaining risks--or undertake avoidance (with the risks
avoidance introduces).335 It does not tell us whether it is acceptable that
some of these groups (e.g., the various Ojibwe tribes and other fishing
peoples) will be made to suffer an affront to their rights to cultural self-
determination.336 It does not tell us whether it is desirable for humans to
preside over diminishing options for food (e.g., the numerous fish, shellfish,
and other species contaminated with methylmercury) and other resources.
Each of these questions reflects judgments of value that are highly
contextualized and risk specific, that take into account the nature of the risk
and the possibilities for avoidance. These judgments ought to bear on
societal determinations of a risk's acceptability.
2. Public Values and Risk Perception
Each risk-with its attendant possibilities for avoidance-might be
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/ria~fmal.pdf [hereinafter EPA, CAMR RIA].
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., STEINZOR, supra note 273.
333. But cf. Lisa Heinzerling et al., supra note 123.
EPA makes several crucial cuts in its benefit calculus: it counts only benefits to
human health (and so excludes ecological health and other benefits, including,
e.g., economic, social, political, cultural and spiritual well-being for the fishing
tribes), and of these human health benefits, it counts only neurodevelopmental
effects and so excludes cardiovascular and other effects. It further winnows the
benefits, by counting only neurodevelopmental effects that are captured by IQ
decrements. Various independent analyses have demonstrated that quantifying
these excluded benefits would reverse the conclusion of the analysis, with the
benefits of regulation dwarfing the costs."
Id.
334. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE SOUTH FLORIDA MERCURY SCIENCE PROGRAM (2005),
http://www.sofia.usfs.gov/publications/posters/mercprogram.
335. See discussion supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
336. See Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe
Goes Whaling, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 165, 167 (2000-2001) (noting the struggles of the Makah tribe
"to preserve a practicing tribal culture on its own terms").
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thought to have a host of morally salient attributes beyond those of
probability and magnitude. Cranor, for example, suggests among these
attributes whether a risk is naturally caused or anthropogenic in origin;
whether exposure to a risk is voluntarily or involuntarily undertaken;
whether a risk can be avoided readily or only with difficulty; whether the
pursuits that entail risk are central to risk-bearers' life plans or merely
peripheral; and whether the burdens of a risk are distributed equally or
not.
337
In fact, individuals' assessments of a particular risk are likely to reflect
their perspectives on these attributes of the risk and to encompass
individuals' judgments of value along these and other lines. Recent work
by cognitive psychologists and other social scientists bears this out and
suggests that cultural values play a vital role in risk perception, infusing all
of the mechanisms through which individuals understand and appraise
risk.338 In view of these findings, Dan Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman,
and John Gastil posit that humans are "cultural evaluators" of risk.339 They
explain: "individuals adopt stances toward risks that express their
commitment to particular ways of life. Their risk perceptions might or
might not be accurate when evaluated from an actuarial standpoint; policies
based on them might or might not be in the interest of society measured
according to any welfarist metric.,,340 Nevertheless, each individual's
perceptions embody a coherent, culturally partisan vision of virtue, justice,
and the ideal society.341
On this view, "expert cost-benefit analysis" not only fails to engage
important questions regarding a risk's moral, cultural, and social
acceptability, but it also obscures the fact that these questions are at stake.
The idea that politically insulated experts should override the public's
evaluations of risk where these are irrational misses the point that
individuals' "irrational" appraisals are inseparable from their "considered
values. 342 It is not possible to elicit only the second, while overriding the
337. Cranor, supra note 307, at 818-24.
338. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on
Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)). For these authors' continued exchange, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural
Evaluations of Risk: "Values " or "Blunders "?, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 166 (2006),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/ 19/feb06/kahan-slovic.pdf.
339. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 338, at 1087. Kahan and his colleagues
distinguish this from views that humans are "rational weighers" or, as Sunstein and Breyer would
suggest, "irrational weighers" of risk. Id.
340. Id. at 1088 (emphasis omitted).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1073.
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first. As Kahan and his co-authors observe, "[r]eliance on expert cost-
benefit analysis, in these circumstances, becomes less a strategy for
rationally implementing public values than a device for strategically
avoiding political disputes over individual virtue and collective justice. '343
Yet these disputes get decided, if only by default. With its cost-benefit
analysis in hand, for example, EPA issued its final rule governing mercury
emissions from coal-fired utilities: it opted for little risk reduction and in
the process determined the answers to questions of inter-species and inter-
generational equity, distributive justice, cultural flourishing, and other
aspects of how society should be ordered.344  Among the judgments
regarding social good that are buried in EPA's analysis is the following:
EPA counts as a benefit of mercury contamination the money society saves
because children with lower IQs as a result of methylmercury exposure will
need fewer years of school.345 By this logic, a rule that does little to reduce
contamination is preferable, because it preserves these "benefits."
Conversely, a more stringent rule would have required that the additional
costs of educating healthy children (i.e., children free from neurological
damage due to methlmercury exposure) be tallied alongside the other costs
of controlling mercury at the source. Thus, an additional consequence of
reliance on expert cost-benefit analysis is that it obscures what is at stake.
Kahan and his co-authors explain: "because [the view that we should rely
on expert cost-benefit analysis] ignores the decisive role that cultural values
play in shaping competing perceptions of risk, [it] mutes the function that
risk regulation plays in adjudicating between competing worldviews. 3 46
3. What Is at Stake, for Whom?
In order to think coherently about risk avoidance, we need to appreciate
not only what is at stake but for whom. Decisions about risk regulation
adjudicate important questions of justice, in the process affecting the life
prospects for both winners and losers. When these decisions are made by
means of cost-benefit analysis, however, these prospects get determined
343. Id.
344. EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 330.
345. Id. at 10-46 to 10-47 (citing data that the average effect of a one point decrease in IQ is a
0.1007 percent decrease in years of schooling and that the average annual expenditure per student is
$5,500). Note that EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis for the CAMR comprises some 566 pages. Id.
346. Id. at 1108. Kahan and his colleagues suggest that this might, in fact, be a virtue of
approaches such as that suggested by Sunstein, inasmuch as it would allow public discourse by
obfuscating conflicts of value, ultimately enabling those with diverse views and values to come together
at the level of "incompletely theorized agreements," as Sunstein has used the term. Id.; see CASS R.
SUNSTEiN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (suggesting
that laws often reflect the absence of completely theorized agreements).
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without acknowledging to whom the benefits will go or on whom the
burdens will fall and without considering what is at stake from their
perspectives.
Decisional tools such as cost-benefit analysis assess tradeoffs in the
abstract, that is, without identifying in advance how any particular
individual (or group of individuals) will fare as a result. As noted above,
cost-benefit analysis presupposes that the goal of risk regulation is
efficiency and that government decision makers ought to maximize the
satisfaction of individual preferences respecting risk. In theory, cost-benefit
analysis does not prefer any one individual's valuation relative to any other.
Rather, preferences are maximized in the aggregate. An outcome is
generally deemed efficient if it satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks test, that is, if the
winners will gain more than the losers will lose. 47 Debate is undertaken in
terms of identityless, "statistical lives," and, importantly, as if we were all
equally likely, ex ante, to be among the winners and the losers.
But with risk avoidance on the table, decision makers are privy to
identifying information. As noted above, given its focus on the point of
exposure, risk avoidance approaches require decision makers to reorient
their expertise, from a focus on the entities and processes that produce
environmental contamination to the humans that are exposed to the
contaminants. As a consequence, decision makers need to identify who will
be asked to protect themselves by altering the practices that expose them to
risk. For example, because agencies need to determine to whom to direct
fish consumption advisories, they need to learn the identities of the
individuals most exposed.348 Because agencies need to decide how to
communicate with and select avoidance alternatives that are plausible for
these individuals, agencies need to learn a great deal about their
circumstances. 349 As a result, decision makers can no longer maintain that
we are all equally likely to be among the winners and the losers. They
know, in advance, who will be faced with the "choice" entailed by a shift to
risk avoidance-and who will end up among the losers.
This point has implications, in turn, for the overall determination of
whether a particular risk, with its attendant possibilities for avoidance, is
morally, culturally, and socially acceptable. If one takes Cranor's
enumeration as a starting point, among the relevant attributes is whether the
347. For a critique of the Kaldor-Hicks or "potential Pareto" criterion in public decisions about
risk, see, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 135, at 34-35.
348. NEJAC FISH CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 40 (noting the consequences of
issuing fish consumption advisories without an understanding of the "affected communities").
349. Id.
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burdens of a risk are distributed equally.350 For example, whereas we might
find the risk from current levels of ozone pollution in the Los Angeles
area-with the means of avoidance suggested by ozone alerts-to be
acceptable, on balance, if the burden were distributed equally across the
population, we might find this risk unacceptable were the burden bome
primarily by African American and Latino children.
3 51
This point bears as well on an evaluation of other morally salient
attributes of a risk. Once one knows the identity of those who will be asked
to undertake avoidance measures, one can (indeed, must-if there is to be
any hope that risk avoidance will be effective, in the sense of eliciting
"compliance") learn something about these individuals' understandings
about the possibilities for avoidance. That is, one can consider, from these
risk-bearers' perspectives, whether exposure to the risk can be said to be
voluntarily or involuntarily undertaken; whether the risk can be avoided
readily or only with considerable difficulty; whether the practices that entail
risk are central to their life plans or merely peripheral.352 To illustrate,
whereas we might find modest reductions in the levels of PCBs and other
contaminants in the Duwamish Waterway and elsewhere in the Puget
Sound to be tolerable, on balance, if the resulting fish consumption
advisories affected only the "typical U.S. consumer," we might find this
risk and means of avoidance to be intolerable if those affected were mainly
members of the various Asian American and Pacific Islander groups in the
area who cannot afford to substitute other sources of protein for the fish
they would catch from these waters.35 3 Likewise, risk avoidance in this
context might be intolerable if those affected where mainly members of the
several Native American peoples indigenous to the area, who understand
fish consumption to be a non-negotiable lifeway, constitutive of their very
identity as fishing peoples.354
Rather than undertake a sober discussion whether we as a society can
support these consequences-whether we can tolerate a particular instance
of distributive injustice, a particular affront to human dignity or cultural
integrity--decisions made by means of cost-benefit analysis are made
350. Cranor, supra note 299, at 824.
351. BLACK LEADERSHIP FORUM ET AL., supra note 256; LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AM.
CITIZENS, supra note 256.
352. Cranor, supra note 307.
353. RUTH SECHENA ET AL., ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER SEAFOOD CONSUMPTION STUDY 1
(1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/rlOearth/offices/oea/risk/a&pi.pdf; see generally NEJAC FISH
CONSUMPTION REPORT, supra note 103, at 92 (documenting that it is an economic necessity for some
groups to fish).
354. See O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 109, at 38-42 (describing the cultural importance
offish, especially salmon, to the various Native peoples of the Pacific Northwest).
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without reference to who is affected and without reference to what is at
stake from their perspective. We are, indeed, shielded from identifying
information and so deprived of any ability even to attempt to understand
fully these consequences. Instead, cost-benefit analysis sanitizes the result,
assuring us that "society" is better off, declining even to entertain questions
of distribution and generally glossing over the fact that the losers do not
actually get compensated (if indeed compensation were possible for what is
lost here).
With risk avoidance on the table, moreover, the point that cost-benefit
analysis obscures the role that risk regulation plays in adjudicating between
competing worldviews is all the more troubling. Decisions in this context
effectively instate one set of values--one culturally partisan vision of the
good-while denigrating others. As I have observed elsewhere, the degree
to which particular risk avoidance proposals seem promising or perilous
depends importantly on the value attached to the practice we would be
asked to forego and the ease or anguish occasioned by the prescribed
avoidance measure. 355 Risk reduction is likely to be preferred where the
practice that exposes humans to risk is viewed as laudable, natural, or
important to living a human life, and where the possible means of
avoidance are understood to occasion profound loss or abridge fundamental
rights.356 Risk avoidance, by contrast, is likely to be enlisted where the
practice is not valued or is viewed as unnecessary, and where avoidance can
be easily and cheaply undertaken. 357  These determinations respecting
importance, necessity, possibility, and ease, are, of course, judgments of
value-judgments about which there are often considerable disagreements.
Moreover, there is likely to be disagreement as between members of the
dominant society and members of some of the various groups who are
prominent among the risk-bearers.358 Where this is so, it seems particularly
important to make explicit the function that decisions about risk avoidance
have in selecting among the alternative worldviews. Indeed, Kahan and his
co-authors argue that we need a mode of regulatory discourse that
"deflect[s] the ambitions of competing cultural groups to claim the law as
theirs and theirs alone." 359 They observe that while the cultural evaluator
model that they propose extinguishes one basis for interfering with the
public's market and political evaluations of risk, i.e., that these evaluations
are sometimes irrational, it introduces another: that public evaluations
355. O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13.
356. Id. at 28-29.
357. Id. at 29.
358. Id.
359. Kahan et al., supra note 338, at 1109.
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"sometimes reflect an unjust desire to use ... law to advance culturally
imperialist ends. 360
How might we ensure that we evaluate a move to risk avoidance fully
cognizant of the value judgments that are in play? How might we ensure
that we reflect upon the morally salient attributes of each risk? The next
section ventures some suggestions to this end.
B. Evaluating Risk.4voidance
A shift to risk avoidance must be judged against the backdrop of an
enduring collective commitment to risk reduction-and to the myriad
commitments (e.g., to intergenerational justice, to ecological health, and to
honor in upholding treaty promises) subsumed therein. Specifically, a shift
to risk avoidance must be assessed in view of the raft of perils detailed
above. To be sure, proponents have a hard row to hoe. Still, there may
sometimes be a place for risk avoidance measures, and the task for decision
makers is to develop a mode of analysis that will enable us to evaluate the
merits of risk avoidance in any particular instance. Although it is beyond
the scope of this Article to propose a full-blown evaluative tool, I
nonetheless offer some considerations for conducting a full and fair debate
on risk avoidance.
1. Account Completely for the Costs of Avoidance
Because claimed cost savings are the engine behind most calls for risk
avoidance, it is important that the full costs of avoidance be included in any
accounting. Although regulatory costs are relatively amenable to
quantification,3 61 decision makers have managed a particularly partial
accounting when avoidance is on the table. The figures currently cited in
favor of a move to risk avoidance would likely be less impressive were they
to incorporate the full costs of communicating, implementing, and
enforcing the risk avoidance measure-and of doing so in perpetuity. In
fact, as noted above, it may be that once these costs of avoidance were
accounted for, risk avoidance in many cases would actually be more costly
than risk reduction-and the calls for avoidance would subside. For
instance, the figures cited tend not to reflect costs stemming from adverse
360. Id. at 1107.
361. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety,
and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1997, 2000 (2002) (observing that, while the benefit
side of a typical cost-benefit analysis is "laden with uncertainties," the cost side is thought to be less so,
but finding that agencies' ex ante estimates of regulatory costs "have usually been high, sometimes by
an order of magnitude, when compared to actual costs incurred").
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effects on human health that result indirectly from contamination left
undiminished (not to mention adverse effects to ecological health).362 Nor
do the figures tend to account for the costs of any human health risks
introduced when risk-bearers adopt alternative practices or lifeways. 363 Nor
do they account for the fact that opting for risk avoidance in any particular
instance may draw down the store of possibilities for avoidance in the
future.364 Note that, to the extent that many of these costs will be felt in a
matter of years or decades, the impact of discounting may be large, in some
instances virtually determining the bottom line.3 65 Arguably, there is no
reason morally to treat with less dignity the lives and prospects of future
generations by virtue of this device.366 At the very least, any accounting
should present the costs both with and without the application of various
discount rates. Finally, when comparing the costs of reduction versus
avoidance, one must subtract from each tally the economic gains generated,
e.g., through jobs created, by the strategy chosen. As a general matter, the
costs of avoidance need to be understood holistically and accounted for
completely.
2. Make Explicit Limitations in Efficacy
At present, risk avoidance does not deliver "the same amount of human
health protection" (even understood in its narrowest sense) as risk
reduction, because risk avoidance measures are not 100% effective.367
Agencies are far from achieving-and, for the reasons outlined above, may
never achieve--complete compliance. This fact needs to be made explicit
any time risk avoidance is contemplated. More specifically, the data
relevant to the efficacy of particular avoidance measure(s) at issue need to
be publicized, including data indicating who is not being reached or is
declining to comply with advisories and who is left unprotected when
institutional controls are not enforced. It may be that an apparent lack of
compliance is a fully informed exercise of autonomy, but it may be that the
only ones whose autonomy is being "respected" turn out to be those who
362. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
363. Id.
364. See discussion supra Part I.C.5.
365. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 941,945 (1999) (explaining that many "environmental
problems produce harms with a latency period whereas others affect future generations"); Lisa
Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025,2026 (1999) (describing the
impact of accounting techniques that "discount the importance of future harms relative to present ones").
366. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 135, at 179-203.
367. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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are likely not to understand the relevant warnings, or those who have
historically been subjected to discrimination.368 In general, all of this
information needs to be disclosed, so that the competing claims can be
assessed with an eye toward what they mean to real people in the real-
rather than an ideal-world.
3. Deliberate in Light of Who Is Affected, What Is at Stake
A move to risk avoidance in any particular instance needs to be the
product of considered public deliberation, framed to elicit reflection upon
whether a risk and its attendant means of avoidance are morally, culturally,
and socially acceptable. Specifically, a shift to risk avoidance needs to be
the product of deliberation in light of who is affected and what is at stake.
Given that risk avoidance focuses on the point of exposure and so requires
decision makers to gather information describing those exposed, we will
know in advance who would be asked to undertake avoidance. Regulatory
ends that are premised on-and legitimized by-the assumption that we do
not have this identifying information (and so are all theoretically equally
likely to be among those asked to undertake avoidance) are a poor fit in this
context. So, too, are decisional tools such as cost-benefit analysis that
evaluate tradeoffs in terms of identityless, statistical lives.
Instead, agencies need to reveal information identifying those likely to
be asked to undertake avoidance. This information is necessary for an
evaluation of the distributive impacts of any proposal for avoidance. This
information is also a prerequisite to an assessment of several other morally
salient features of a risk and its attendant possibilities for avoidance. It is
only when we know who it is that will be asked to undertake avoidance that
we can begin to discern whether they consider exposure to the risk to be
voluntary or involuntary; whether they understand the pursuits that entail
risk to be central or peripheral to their life plans; whether they think they
could avoid the risk readily or only with difficulty.3 69 Relatedly, if the
possible means of avoidance are several, it will be important to discern
whether they view one or some among the options as plausible.
Information identifying those left to undertake avoidance is relevant for
other reasons as well. If those most exposed turn out disproportionately to
be members of certain groups, this may affect our assessment of any
autonomy and responsibility arguments that might be offered on behalf of
368. See discussion supra Part II.C.3
369. Other features of a risk and its possibilities for avoidance may be relevant as well; this list,
drawn from Cranor's work, however, seems like a good starting point. Cranor, supra note 307, at 818-
24.
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risk avoidance. If the risk-bearers turn out in large part to be children, for
example, our willingness to assign responsibility to them to avoid the risks
they face might be significantly decreased. Indeed, depending on the
identity of the affected group, an array of normative and positive legal
commitments may be implicated, a point taken up in the next section.
Generally, decisions about whether to employ risk avoidance ought to
be framed so as to encourage reflection upon the larger questions that are in
fact at stake. Is it a good idea to opt for risk avoidance where it means that
future generations may be left with no fish that are safe to eat? Where it
means that millions of us will be confined indoors in the summer? Where it
means that a host of longstanding human activities will be ushered out? We
need to ask and answer these questions. Ultimately, we need to decide,
collectively, whether this is the kind of world in which we wish to live.
Finally, the fact that important values are implicated ought not to be
downplayed or obscured, lest disputes over these values be adjudicated by
default. To the contrary, in order to be supportable, decisions respecting
risk avoidance must be made with full knowledge of what is getting
resolved in the process.
4. Eschew Avoidance Where It Abridges Important Rights or Values
Risk avoidance should be eschewed where it will encroach upon
important rights or profoundly held values. Although this injunction is
already likely to be followed where the rights or values at issue belong to
members of the dominant society, it is less likely to be observed where the
rights or values belong to non-dominant groups and their members.3 70 In
particular, as I have argued elsewhere, risk avoidance will often simply be
unacceptable where American Indian tribes and their members,
communities of color, and low-income communities are disproportionately
among those called upon to undertake avoidance.371  This claim is
supported by an array of normative and positive legal commitments. It will
sometimes be the case that risk avoidance would run afoul of societal
commitments to address what might be termed exclusionary
discrimination-discrimination that imposes burdens on members of non-
dominant groups, burdens that are not suffered by members of dominant or
370. See, e.g., GuIO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 18-19 (1985) (discussing the role of individuals' ideals,
beliefs, and attitudes arising from cultural differences in societal assessments of the "reasonableness" of
their behavior); O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13, at 3-4 (noting that "the
burden of undertaking avoidance is unlikely to fall on members of the dominant society").
371. O'Neill, Risk Avoidance and Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13, at 25.
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majority groups.372 At other times, it will be the case that risk avoidance
would run afoul of societal commitments to address what might be termed
cultural discrimination--discrimination that works to suppress or obliterate
cultural bonds by stifling the expression of non-dominant or minority
groups' cultures. 373 These commitments are also enshrined in positive law.
Depending on the group affected, risk avoidance may run up against
protections flowing from the U.S. Constitution, treaties, the federal trust
responsibility, civil rights statutes, and executive commitments to
environmental justice.374
5. Cabin Risk Avoidance
Where risk avoidance is selected, it needs to be held to the terms under
which it is authorized. Where it is sanctioned initially as a temporary
measure, risk avoidance needs to be limited in duration. In the (presumably
rarer) instances in which risk avoidance is selected as a longer-term
measure, it needs to be held to its terms-and these terms should be
revisited periodically. Given that it takes time to reduce or clean up
contamination, risk avoidance might appropriately be undertaken as an
interim measure, designed to inform those exposed and to mitigate the
human health impacts-while risk reduction is pursued in earnest. In the
case of methylmercury contamination, for example, even serious efforts to
reduce mercury emissions would take anywhere from a few months to a few
years to net results in the form of reduced methylmercury in aquatic
environments and, ultimately, in fish tissue.375 And in the case of a handful
of pollution problems-mainly stemming from large-scale past releases of
contaminants, such as the dispersal of PCBs over many miles of the Hudson
River or the broadcast of arsenic throughout the southern Puget Sound as a
result of copper smelting at the ASARCO facility in Tacoma,
Washington-reduction efforts will likely reasonably take decades.376 In
372. 1 am indebted to Jim Anaya for his explication of discrimination relevant to ethnocultural
groups, among them Native peoples, as consisting of both exclusionary and cultural discrimination. See
Anaya, supra note 230, at 227-29. Exclusionary discrimination might also impede non-dominant group
members' realization of the benefits and privileges commonly enjoyed by members of majority or
dominant groups. Id.
373. Anaya, supra note 230, at 228.
374. See, e.g., O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 109, at 100-16 (discussing legal obligations
under treaties, the federal trust responsibility, civil rights statutes, and executive commitments); O'Neill,
Protecting the Tribal Harvest, supra note 41 (discussing legal obligations under treaties, the Equal
Protection Clause, and civil rights statutes).
375. See, e.g., O'Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, supra note 17, at 11,091-92 (discussing the
relatively rapid ecological responses that would be expected from reductions in mercury emissions).
376. See U.S. ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, HUDSON RIVER PCBs SrrE, NEW YORK: RECORD OF
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the meantime, it is vital that those exposed be made aware of the nature and
extent of the contamination, the consequences for human and ecological
health, the possibilities for avoidance, and, ideally, any opportunities to
facilitate reduction.377
However, the need to inform the public in the meantime-to respect
their "right to know"--should not be used as cover for increased reliance on
risk avoidance. 378  And the need temporarily to lean on risk avoidance
should not be taken to authorize risk avoidance for the duration. As noted
above, agencies have now relied on fish consumption advisories and ozone
alerts for decades as pollution control efforts lag. Important headway could
be made, of course, simply by holding agencies to their statutory duties and
deadlines.
Ideally, where risk avoidance is selected, it would be authorized for a
discrete period and under specified terms (e.g., that regulations are issued
on time and that cleanup is pursued expeditiously), with a sunset provision
requiring additional deliberation for any renewal periods. As part of this
periodic deliberation, any changing circumstances affecting the possibilities
for reduction and avoidance (e.g., technological innovations that render
reduction less costly and toxicological information that renders risk
avoidance more problematic) should be considered. As a corollary,
regulatory strategies that incorporate avoidance ought to be fashioned, to
the extent feasible, so as not to foreclose future options for reduction; this
DECISION (undated document), available at http://www.epa.gov/hudson/RecordofDecision-text.pdf
(discussing cleanup remedies for PCB contamination in the Hudson River); ENVT'L HEATH Div.,
PUBLIC HEALTH-SEATTLE & KING COUNTY, FINAL REPORT: VASHON MAURY ISLAND SOIL STUDY
1999-2000 (2000), available at http://metrokc.gov/health/hazard/finatrpt72500.pdf (documenting arsenic
contamination in soils on islands downwind of the former ASARCO Copper Smelter and beyond the
boundaries of ongoing Superfund cleanup in the immediate vicinity of a former smelter).
377. Ideally, advisories would inform the public how they might weigh in on ongoing debates
involving the pollution problems that give rise to advisories. In addition, to the extent that humans are
the sources of the relevant environmental contaminants as well as the receptors, advisories would
include information about how to reduce their contribution. See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 141
(asserting that humans ought to be held accountable for their role as sources of pollutants). Note that
some ozone alerts include information of the latter sort, identifying ways that people can engage in risk
reduction efforts (e.g., by refueling vehicles after sundown; by refraining from using gasoline-powered
lawn and garden equipment; and by reducing driving and idling time). See, e.g., REGION 5, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, OZONE ACTION DAY, available at
http://www.epa.gov/ARD-R5/ozoneday/ozoneday.htm (listing ten things people can do to reduce
ground-level ozone formation).
378. See, e.g., O'Neill, Mercury. Risk and Justice, supra note 17, at 11,107 n.388 (describing
the National Mining Association's efforts to portray the Environmental Defense Fund's (EDF) "Seafood
Selector," an on-line resource publicizing existing fish consumption advisories, as evidence that "the
environmental community is becoming increasingly aware that dietary modification and education are
the keys to an effective mercury risk management strategy," where the EDF elsewhere makes clear that
it advocates risk reduction rather than risk avoidance for mercury contamination).
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will be particularly important for those pollution problems that appear at
present to be intractable or solvable only at extraordinary cost.
CONCLUSION
The single-minded pursuit of (a certain brand of) rationality in risk
regulation threatens to undermine our ability to make considered decisions
about the kind of society we wish to be and the kind of world in which we
wish to live. In this quest for rationality, questions are framed in ways that
narrow our field of vision, while claiming to introduce reason: ground-level
ozone pollution is a benefit, because it shields against harmful ultraviolet
radiation-never mind that such protection is necessitated in the first place
by anthropogenic contributions to the diminishing stratospheric ozone
layer.379 In this quest for rationality, decisional tools are enlisted that make
bold judgments of value, while purporting to be neutral arbiters:
methylmercury contamination is a good thing, because it enables society to
save the money it would have to spend to educate children were their
neurological systems not impaired. °
The case for risk avoidance appears to rest primarily on the claim that
it can provide "the same amount of human health protection" for less
money than current risk reduction approaches. As such, it invokes just this
brand of rationality and invites just the sort of calculus that fails to
encompass much of what is at stake in a decision whether to rely on risk
avoidance. Although risk avoidance may seem promising in some
instances, it is also perilous. We need as a society to develop a mode of
analysis that does not obscure what is at stake and for whom. We need to
frame the debate so that it considers the larger question of whether a given
risk and its attendant possibilities for avoidance are morally, culturally, and
socially acceptable. In the end, we need to reflect upon the very basic
question of whether this is the direction we wish to take environmental law
and policy: whether we wish to shape a world in which our children can no
longer make mud pies.
379. See generally Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Envt'l Prot. Agency, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051-53 (D.C.
Cir. 1999),affdin part and rev'd in part, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
380. EPA, CAMR RIA, supra note 330, at 10-46 to 10-47.
[Vol. 31:273
HeinOnline  -- 31 Vt. L. Rev. 354 2006-2007
